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SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT
Progressive has never provided any valid justification for its alleged defenses.1
Instead, it provides abstract assertions that insureds should not receive a "windfall"2 if no
loss was incurred. But Mrs. Martinez suffered a loss. Progressive never alleged that Mrs.
Martinez suffered no loss. Nothing in the record would lead a reasonable person to
conclude there was no loss. Therefore, the abstractions relied on by Progressive are
completely irrelevant and have the potential to be misleading.
Injured motorists should be able to recover the reasonable value of all their out-ofpocket expenses within 30 days of providing reasonable proof.3 The delay imposed by
Progressive, coupled with its fractious defense, resulted years of litigation and attendant
attorney fees incurred by Mrs. Martinez in contravention of the express purpose of the nofault statute.
1

Neither insurance adjusters, judges nor lawyers are capable of understanding or
applying the "standard" that Progressive calls "reasonable and necessary." The stock
phrases and "magic words" certainly carry no talismanic assurance of comprehension by
injured motorists untrained in the law. See Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 771 P.2d
1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989).
2

Plaintiff seeks full reimbursement (not a "windfall") consistent with the law of
damages "so that she may be restored, as nearly as possible, to the position she was in
prior to the injury." Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah App.
1997) (citations omitted).
3

"Under contract principles the [insured motorist] should not be denied benefits
unless a provision in the statutory contract between the [insured motorist], the state,
and the [PIP carrier] explicitly suspends the benefits." King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850
P.2d 1281 (Utah 1993) (interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act) (citation omitted).
The foregoing statement of law is even more suited to PIP contracts for several reasons:
(1) PIP benefits are limited to specific amounts; (2) PIP contracts are first-party contracts
for which the insured has personally paid the premium, whereas injured employees are
third-party claimants; and (3) The current statutory language of the no-fault statute
affords no delay pursuant to Section 31 A-22-309(5).

Progressive must pay the attorney fees owed by Mrs. Martinez to her attorneys. If it
were allowed to unilaterally reduce its contractual obligation through nothing more than
stubborn litigiousness, // would receive a windfall.4 Many laws are enacted to prohibit bad
people from doing bad things. The attorney fees provision of the no-fault statute was
enacted to encourage good people to do good things. The trial court's refusal to award
attorney fees despite the statutory imperative undermines legislative intent. The district
court's failure to comply with the law would discourage all future enforcement of the nofault statute.
RESPONSES TO PROGRESSIVES "FACTS"
The relevant facts have never been disputed: (1) Mrs. Martinez incurred over $1,000
in medical expenses which were not paid for her second accident because Progressive
claimed, without any admissible evidence, that her husband waived5 her right to payment

4

"Utah's no-fault insurance statute provides first party compensation, thereby
enabling an injured party to expeditiously obtain recompense for financial needs,
without bearing the expense and lengthy delay associated with litigation to establish
fault. In return for the disallowance of general damages ("all damages other than those
awarded for economic losses"), a tort victim is given immediate payment of medical
expenses and lost wages. The Utah no-fault insurance law has no effect on a tort victim's
ability to completely recover pecuniary losses." Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 55859 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis added). If a PIP carrier can simply deny payment of PIP
benefits, does this determination mean that the tortfeasor's partial tort immunity is
eliminated too? It must follow that the insured tortfeasor is not immune from suit if
special damages are "not covered" by PIP coverage. See, e^g., ROBERT KEETON & ALAN
I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW, § 4.10 at p. 419 (2d ed. 1988).
5

Progressive never used the legal term "waived" and instead claimed that it was
"justified" in cutting off benefits because of this alleged statement which Plaintiff denies
was made, and if it was made was taken out of context, and if it was made it was
irrelevant because he had no legal authority to waive her contractual right. Mrs. Martinez
sought legal counsel mere days after the alleged waiver. Moreover, Progressive failed to
attempt to bear its burden of proof. See R590-190 attached hereto as EXHIBIT B.
2

for these bills; (2) Mrs. Martinez was advised not to work by her doctors because of the
injury to her sympathetic nerve (Horner's Syndrome), yet Progressive refused to pay her
lost wages benefits because Progressive wanted to hire CorVel to do some sort of
"investigation" that is not allowed by the statute;6 (3) Mrs. Martinez hired a woman to clean
her house, take care of her three small children and husband, and to prepare meals and do
laundry for $20 per day, yet Progressive called the work "not reasonable and necessary"
compared to a chart authored by its claims adjuster after Progressive had received
reasonable proof; (4) Progressive ultimately was required by the underlying action to pay
$13,424.83 for past-due PIP benefits. But see Opp. at p. 4, Tf 18 (claiming that Plaintiff
pursued "a $3,000 PIP claim" which, if believed, would discount Plaintiffs successful
results); and (5) Mrs. Martinez incurred a debt of $72,885 to her attorneys for their
successful protection of her contractual and statutory rights.
Progressive's 13. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment which was fully
supported and uncontroverted, and Defendant responded with an unsupported cross motion
(it attached several letters it had written). See Kimball & Boyce, Utah Evidence Law at 8328-34. Judge McCleve granted Defendant's premature, unsupported motion by adopting
Progressive's arguments.7 (Record 265).

6

When a PIP carrier refuses to pay lost wages, the insured is faced with a
Hobson's choice, disobey the treating physician or attempt to meet daily living expenses
without income or promised (and paid for) benefits. Mrs. Martinez went back to work.
So she had no "loss" of wages after being cut off, and therefore received no lost wages
benefits for the time period after returning to work. Plaintiff does not deny the
profitability of Progressive's assertions (for it). But see Pugh v. North Am. Warr. Svcs.,
2000 UT App 121, If 20, 1 P.3d 570.
7

But See e ^ Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729 (3rd Cir. 2004)
("Judicial opinions are the core work-product of judges. They are much more than findings
3

Progressive's 5, 6, 7, 8. 9, 10, 11.

Page 100 of the record is a divider. The 80%

assertion is not supported anywhere in the record and its alleged relevance is not, and never
was, explained in violation of R590-190-10(2). Progressive's letter regarding whether Mrs.
Martinez felt "worse" was neither relevant nor admissible to prove that assertion; rather the
record demonstrates Progressive presented a false choice to Plaintiff in violation of R590190-9(8). (Record 184-85 is the only time Progressive purported to set forth a transcription
(in a reply memorandum), but the alleged transcript was not sworn or complete). The
alleged statement by Mr. Martinez is not relevant. The letter written by Progressive
asserting a statement was not admissible for that purpose. There is no record of CorVel
doing anything. The letter written by Progressive asserting their inability to perform a
function that is not contemplated by the no-fault statute is not admissible to prove anything
that might be relevant and is in violation of R590-190-8. See also Connor v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 417-18 (Utah 1998) (holding motion for summary judgment
supported by mere assertions improperly granted).
Plaintiffs Facts.

Progressive does not challenge the facts as stated by Plaintiff in

her opening brief.

of fact and conclusions of law; they constitute the logical and analytical explanations of why
a judge arrived at a specific decision. They are tangible proof to the litigants that the judge
actively wrestled with their claims and arguments and made a scholarly decision based on his
or her own reason and logic. When a court adopts a party's proposed opinion as its own, the
court vitiates the vital purposes served by judicial opinions. * * * Courts and judges exist to
provide neutral fora in which persons and entities can have their professional disputes and
personal crises resolved. Any degree of impropriety, or even the appearance thereof,
undermines our legitimacy and effectiveness."); Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656
P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) ("The functions of issue-formulation and fact-revelation are
appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process."); Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24,
^f 32 ("Because these [material] facts were not developed below, the grant of summary
judgment was premature.").
4

ARGUMENT
I.

PROGRESSIVE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 7(f)(2)
PREVENTED THE "FILING" OF THE MINUTE ENTRY.

This Court lacked jurisdiction over the previous notice of appeal because it was
premature. Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "requires that copies of a
proposed judgment be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court. The
notice requirement of Rule [7(f)(2)] . . . is supplemental to and not inconsistent with Rule
58A

To harmonize and give proper effect to these rules, we hold that compliance with

Rule [7(f)(2)] is necessary in order that a judgment be properly 'filed' as that term is used
in Rule 58A...." Bigelow v. Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50, 52 (Utah 1980).
The Notice of Appeal filed September 15, 2004 provides this Court with jurisdiction
over the entire underlying matter. The minute entry dated April 6, 2004 cannot be
considered to have been "filed"8 and this failure of a condition prevented the ruling from
being "entered" which in turn prevented the time for appeal from running. Calfo v. D.C.
Stewart Co.. 717 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1986). "Because Rule [7(f)(2)] was not complied
with here, there was no judgment from which an appeal could be taken until [August 16,
2004]." Id
Progressive fails to acknowledge its failure to comply with Rule 7(f)(2) and fails to
acknowledge the binding law cited by Plaintiff in her opening brief. Opp. at pp. 6-9.
Instead, it asserts that the minute entry did not contemplate further action. Id at p. 7 (citing
State v. Leatherbury). By citing an abstract rule from a criminal case and assuming similar

8

Progressive argues (Opp. at p. 11) that Rule 58A(d) controls the issue of notice.
Notice is not the issue. "Filing" is the issue. This issue is addressed in Rule 58A(c).
5

facts, Progressive assumes the same rule applies. However, Progressive knows that the
facts are not similar. Rule 7 provides that a minute entry's silence as to preparation of an
order compelled further action by Progressive. It failed to take further action. Its failure to
comply with Rule 7 does not divest Mrs. Martinez of her constitutional right of appeal.
II.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFF JUSTIFIABLY RELIED ON
RULE 7(f)(2) WHILE WAITING FOR PROGRESSIVE TO PREPARE
AN ORDER, AND JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE IS EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT, MISTAKE, INADVERTENCE, AND SURPRISE.

Essentially, Progressive claims that Plaintiff unreasonably waited for it and the
district court to comply with the process required by Rule 7. Opp. at p. 10-11. This
assertion stands in stark contrast to the purpose of rules. The Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure exist in order to avoid expensive disputes relating to the proper administration of
justice by providing guidance in advance. Plaintiff is aware of no law which might exempt
Progressive from being required to obey Rule 7. Therefore, Plaintiffs delay9 while
attempting to obtain clarification relating to Progressive's and the district court's
compliance with Rule 7 was not unreasonable.
Rule 7(f)(2) required Progressive to prepare an order to formalize the district court's
ruling contained in its minute entry.10 The language of the rule is "shall" and the time for

9

Plaintiff did not "delay" because there was no Rule 7 compliant order.

10

Progressive argues (Opp. At p. 10) that "a reasonable attorney . . . would have
known that" a notice of appeal should be filed within 30 days of an order. Progressive's
argument begs the question: When was an order filed? Only by assuming the truth of the
contested condition can Progressive conclude the contingent rule applies. Circular
assumptions do not constitute analysis. An appellee's brief may be frivolous if it consists
"of irrelevant and illogical arguments based on factual misrepresentations and false
premises." Romala Corp. v. United States. 927 F.2d 1219, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see
6

compliance is 15 days. And (a) the district court did not direct an alternate procedure; and
(b) Progressive did not prepare an order within 15 days.
About 15 days after the minute entry was created, Plaintiff was justifiably concerned
about her right of appeal. Plaintiff inquired if the district court planned to issue an
amended minute entry11 or whether it intended to order Progressive to comply with Rule
7(f)(2).
The district court's clerk promised Plaintiff that she would ask the judge for
guidance and return Plaintiffs telephone calls. She did not respond. Reliance on the
promise made by the district court was not unreasonable. Litigants are entitled to expect
the district courts to fulfill promises.
III.

$0.00 FOR NEARLY EIGHT YEARS OF LITIGATION IS NOT
REASONABLE UNDER ANY STANDARD.

The record reveals no substantial evidence to support an award of $0.00. State v.
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to
award less than the amount of fees claimed absent reasonable justification. Bell v. Bell 810
P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991). Indeed, this Court has made it clear that a trial court
"'abuses its discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees] requested unless
the reduction is warranted' by one or more of the [Dixie] factors." Endrody v. Endrody.
914 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). It is

also Opp. at 16 ("The plaintiff did nothing to pursue his [sic] breach of contract [cause of
action]...." but see, e ^ , R. 24, R. 268, R. 320, R. 583).
11

A nunc pro tunc order is used to "correct the court's omission or error." In re
Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah App. 1993).
7

undisputed that the district court did not rely on, or find any facts relating to, any of the
Dixie factors.12 And Progressive indisputably provided no evidence to contradict Plaintiffs
affidavit or the contents of the record.13
[N]either the court nor the jury should be permitted to stubbornly
ignore and refuse to be guided by competent, credible and
uncontradicted evidence. The arbitrary and unreasoning imposition of
one man's will upon another is the essence of tyranny and the
antithesis of justice. Not even an American jury with its unquestioned
broad discretion should be permitted to so flout the rights of those who
seek civil justice.
Arnold Machinery Company, Inc. v. Intrusion Prepakt Inc., 357 P.2d 496 (Utah 1960)
(noting, in the same paragraph, that such principles simultaneously do not bind a fact finder
to accept self-interested evidence whole cloth; rather a jury's determination should not be
disturbed so long as it appears to be within the limits of reason). The district court
disregarded the contents of the record and the uncontroverted evidence.14

12

The district court named some of the Dixie factors, but the refusal to enforce the
attorney fees provision seems to have been primarily predicated on the notion (with no
adequate findings) that the allocation was insufficient (a legal conclusion applying the
wrong standard to the undisputed facts) (Record 857, lines 11-15).
13

See Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975)
(treating request for attorney fees as a summary judgment motion where, as here, petition
was unrebutted); "Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly support's the trial court's
decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact precludes appellate review of the
evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and requires remand for more
detailed findings by the trial court." Quinn v. Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282, 286 (Utah App. 1992).
14

"The . . . act here involved . .. contemplates disbursements to the prevailing
party in every case. The court has no right to deny those necessarily paid or incurred.
They follow the verdict as a matter of course." Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93, 1 P.2d
950 (1931) (discussing costs under a statute that appears to have preceded Rule 54).
8

IV.

THE FEE-SHIFTING PROVISION OF THE NO-FAULT STATUTE
REQUIRES PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES.

The legislature adopted what is called a "fee-shifting" statute when it adopted the
no-fault statute. The purpose of fee-shifting statutes is, essentially, twofold: (a) to
encourage those who are governed by the statute to comply with its terms; and (b) to
encourage attorneys to enforce compliance when retained by one whose rights under the
statute were disregarded. Both of these purposes would be undermined by failing to order
Progressive to pay a reasonable attorney fee.15 "The rationale of fee-shifting rules is that
the victor should be made whole — should be as well off as if the opponent had
respected h[er] legal rights in the first place. This cannot be accomplished if the victor
must pay for the appeal [and all other litigation] out of h[er] own pocket." Rickels v. South
Bend, 33 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added): see also Commissioner of INS v.
Jean, 496 U.S. 154(1990).
Payment of attorney fees is mandatory under the no-fault statute. If this Court were
to fail to reverse the district court and remand this matter for appropriate consideration
under the proper legal rules, such inaction would encourage Progressive and other insurers
to continue to deny PIP benefits to injured motorists in contravention of the legislative

15

This case violates an important principle: "A request for attorney's fees should
not result in a second major litigation." Hensley v. Eckerhart 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
The Court should avoid an interpretation of this fee-shifting statute that will spawn new
litigation of a significant dimension. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 2001 UT 89, Tl 121, 65 P.3d 1134 (approving "actual fees" as the proper measure of
the amount of fees). And the Court should properly interpret the scope of coverage
required by the no-fault statute in order to reduce the need for future litigation.
9

intent underlying the no-fault statute by eliminating any downside risk.16
When an attorney agrees to assist an injured motorist whose insurance company
refuses to comply with the no-fault statute, the attorney ordinarily cannot obtain a share of
the PIP benefits because those benefits are intended to assist the injured motorist with daily
living expenses. When the efforts of the attorney result, as here, in requiring the insurance
company to comply with the law, his actions are "vindicating a policy that [the legislature]
considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear
their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the
public interest by invoking the . . . powers of the [state] courts." Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (discussing Title II racial discrimination injunctions
and the requirement that attorney fees be awarded under that provision).
V.

LEGAL STANDARD UNDER THE FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE.

The attorney "fee provision [of the no-fault statute] was needed 'to encourage
private enforcement because lack of judicial interpretation hampered the act's
effectiveness^7] and penalties for noncompliance would otherwise be inadequate.'" L.A.
16

An insurer "with its greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce
compliance with its position. Where compliance is coerced, precedent may be established
on the basis of an uncontested order rather than the thoughtful presentation and
consideration of opposing views." Jean, 496 U.S. at n. 14.
17

Progressive's brief underscores the imbalance that exists between insureds and
PIP carriers and the need for increased private enforcement and judicial guidance. It has
been decades since the no-fault statute received appropriate judicial interpretation
regarding the scope of coverage and the trigger of coverage. The imbalance is evidenced,
for example, by Progressive's request that the Court abandon the American Rule and
award it attorney fees because it alleges Mrs. Martinez seeks to "make new law."
"Making new law" is the purpose of appellate courts whose role it is to develop a
10

Times Comm. v. L.A. Ctv. Board, Supvr., 112 Cal.App. 4th 1313, 1327 (Ct. App. Cal. 2nd
Dist., Div. 8 2003) (applying the Piggie Park standard to the Brown Act). Because the
legislature requires payment of attorney fees to vindicate important statutory rights by
private enforcement, the general rule holds that plaintiffs must ordinarily recover their fees
unless special circumstances would make the fee award unjust. See Society of Professional
Journalists v. Briggs. 687 F.Supp. 1521, 1523 (D. Utah 1988). The burden of proving
"special circumstances" rests with the defendant who must provide a "strong showing" that
such circumstances exist. And denial of fee awards on that basis arise only in unusual
situations that are not present in this case. See Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624
F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1980). In sum, in order to advance the legislative intent of the nofault statute, attorney fees are awarded as a matter of course — lest denial become the rule
rather than the unusual exception. See J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie. 767 F.2d
1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1985).
VI.

FEE-SHIFTING PRINCIPLES UNDER UTAH LAW.

In Prince v. Bear River, the Utah Supreme Court employed the language of
fee-shifting cases when affirming the arbitrary $450 award18 despite the absence of any
common law jurisprudence which provides gloss for statutes enacted by the legislature in
derogation of common law (the tort-based defenses raised by Progressive were abrogated
in 1973). It is also the purpose for the no-fault statute's fee-shifting provision.
18

Progressive proposes an arbitrary award of $500: "In the present case, a similar
type of award is necessary." Opp. at p. 16. While Plaintiff appreciates Progressive's
concession that $0.00 is unreasonable on its face, the $500 suggestion is arbitrary and
similarly unreasonable. Progressive's basis is its assertion: "Other than filing the original
complaint, there was no discovery, motions, memoranda, or arguments presented to the
trial court regarding the breach of contract claim." Id. This assertion is not consistent
11

factual findings supporting the extreme reduction.19 The court declared the breach of
contract issue "moot" and it discussed a version of the "prevailing party" concept.
Mootness is primarily a doctrine derived from Article III courts and their limited
jurisdiction;20 whereas state courts enjoy plenary jurisdiction. And the "prevailing party"
concept has existed for a very long time,21 but it does not exist in Utah's no-fault statute
thereby giving rise to the inference that the legislature knew of the term and chose not to
employ it. The Utah Supreme Court entered its "mootness" ruling without any substantial
analysis. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 68, f 26, 56 P.3d 524. It seems to
have concluded that Bear River's "voluntary" payment "mooted" Prince's claim. Id. at ^
56. However, "[i]t is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice does not deprive a . . . court of its power to determine the legality of the practice"
unless it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur." Buckhannon 532 U.S. at 609 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citations omitted). The

with the record. (R. 1 through 857).
19

A primary basis for the court's decision to affirm was the lack of allocation.
The court raised that issue sua sponte. There was allocation, but there was no
presentation of unallocated time. Plaintiffs counsel did not include a transcript in the
record thereby depriving the court of evidence that both counsel for the defendant and the
trial court had explicitly waived disclosure of unallocated time.
20

The court did not explore the nuances of what has been called the "flexible
character of the Article III mootness doctrine." United States Parole Commission v.
Geraghtv. 445 U.S. 388, 402-04, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1211-12, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980).
21

See Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Va. D.H.R.R.. 532 U.S. 598.
610-11 (2001) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Mansfield C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111
U.S. 379, 387 (1884)).
12

Prince court affirmed Bear River's legal obligation to pay attorney fees, and it addressed
the amount as a separate issue.22
Although the Prince reasoning is not very clear, it is easily distinguishable. The
situations giving rise to the "voluntary," "moot," and "prevailing party" discussion are not
present in the instant case. Therefore, the Prince court's apparent implementation of the
fee-shifting caselaw from federal and state courts supports an entirely different result.
The district court's order in which Progressive agreed to pay all past due PIP
benefits together with interest due was Progressive's response to the court's order that
Progressive be required to provide the discovery requested by Mrs. Martinez.23 (R. 630
and EXHIBIT A). In addition to agreeing to pay all past-due benefits, Progressive waived its
right to argue that its actions were "not 'required by the action.'" Id,
The "judicial imprimatur" on this settlement made Mrs. Martinez the "prevailing
party" under federal and Utah caselaw because it effected a sufficient change in the legal
The court's separate treatment of the attorney fees obligation was legal error
which led to the separate legal error relating to allocation because proper analysis cannot
be divorced from guiding legal principles. Under the no-fault statute, attorney fees are
not "consequential damages." Attorney fees is an explicit benefit the payment of which is
contingent only on a finding (or as in this case a waiver of the defense) that the insurer
was "required by the action" to pay benefits. The allocation burden arises out of the
second prong of a consequential damages analysis, but this fee-shifting statute gives rise
to normal contractual damages. Those courts that hold that the lack of allocation justifies
a reduction or denial are implicitly premised on the plaintiffs failure to satisfy one of the
required elements of the consequential damages analysis. At any rate, Plaintiff did
allocate fees in this case (Record 676). So this issue is truly "moot." However, the
analysis is helpful to the Court's understanding of the particular contract and statutory
scheme at issue.
23

Progressive asserts (Opp. at p. 16) there was "no discovery," but this assertion is
belied by the contents of the record. (E.g., Record 418-424).
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relationship as contrasted with a purely "voluntary" payment. But more importantly,
Progressive's express waiver of its sole defense to payment of attorney fees satisfied the
plain language of Section 309(5) of the no-fault statute.
Returning to the "reasonableness" of $0.00 for nearly eight (8) years of successful
litigation, the Court must consider the intent of the legislature in enacting the no-fault
statute rather than decontextualized comments pulled from caselaw involving commercial
contracts or punishment. It is well-settled that the rates charged and hours billed are not
conclusive of the amount of a reasonable fee. It is also well-settled that a litigant waives
the right to attorney fees if claims are not presented to the district court.24
The proper test to apply for attorney fee benefits under the no-fault statute is the
same as that applied to federal civil rights actions and other fee-shifting statutes as the
Prince court's discussion implies. The trial court's discretion under this standard for
attorney fee awards "has been interpreted very narrowly. [25] To act as an effective
incentive for injured parties to seek judicial relief for their civil rights violations, 'fee
24

If Plaintiff had requested $50 per hour, she would have waived the right to
receive proper compensation. And if Plaintiff had allocated compensable work to a
non-compensable category, that allocation would serve as a waiver of those hours. Given
the caselaw, Progressive's complaints regarding the amounts claimed are not well-taken.
The district court could have made reasoned deductions if it had found relevant facts.
25

In addition to narrowing the discretion because this is a fee-shifting statute, the
Court must recognize that Judge Quinn was not in a superior position to understand the
nature of the litigation. The only participation in this case by Judge Quinn was his refusal
to enforce the attorney fees provision of the no-fault statute. Therefore, the traditional
justification for affording broad discretion to district courts is completely lacking. A
review that approximates a de novo review is appropriate. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
937 (Utah 1994) (assigning de novo review where issue is applying legal principles to
undisputed facts).
14

awards should be the rule rather than the exception.'" L.A. Times 112 Cal. App. 4th at 1327.
"In short, the trial court has the discretion to deny successful. .. plaintiffs their attorney
fees, but only if the defendant shows special circumstances .. . ." Id And the district court
cannot decrease a fee award based on factors not raised at all by the adverse party. Rode v.
Dellarciprete. 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3rd Cir. 1990).
The Utah Supreme Court employed a variation of this standard when it refused to
defer to the decision of an administrative agency when attorney fees were improperly
reduced. Barker v. Utah Public Service Com'n, 970 P.2d 702, 711 (Utah 1998) (affording
no deference to the agency's reduction of attorney fees in a common fund case and
applying a multiplier of 2.5 for risk of nonpayment and public benefit). The administrative
agency, like the district court in this case, misunderstood that the law encourages attorneys
to protect legal rights. Unjustified reductions would discourage lawyers from taking risks
that inure to the benefit of members of the public. That case also took six years of
litigation. The lawyers in that case were awarded $1.2 million dollars.
Progressive claims that $72,885 is "outlandish" (Opp. at p. 9) and "incredulous
[sic]" (Opp. at p. 14), but it fails to compare the attorney fees in this case to its own
attorney fees debt (the best point of comparison) or anything else — such as the amount of
attorney fees incurred in other cases that took six years to litigate. The word "outlandish"
seems to imply a comparison in order to be constructive.
Progressive seems to raise five objections: (1) it objects to $500 per hour as being
pricey; (2) it objects to what it calls "double billing" for 15 date/time entries; (3) it contends
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"there was no discovery, motions, memoranda, or arguments presented to the trial court
regarding the breach of contract claim;" (4) it contends Mrs. Martinez's counsel failed to
make an allocation of time and fees; and (5) it contends the issues are neither novel nor
complex. Opp. at 14-18. Plaintiff will consider each of these criticisms, and the absence of
any supporting evidence provided by Progressive in support of each objection, in turn.26
First, $500.00 per hour must be viewed as the opportunity cost of a personal injury
lawyer27 taking time away from obtaining tort settlements in order to prosecute a contract
action against an insurance company. Barker 970 P.2d at 712. The opportunity costs
include the time value of money and the lost opportunity to bill for other cases together
with the risk that the attorney fees requirement of Section 309(5) would be disregarded by
the district court. $500 per hour is reasonable on the basis of time, effort, and expertise.
Second, Progressive provides no evidence there was "double billing." The only
evidence before the district court was that the research in Prince and Martinez was shared.
(Record at 554). In other words, Bear River was billed for half (which it unjustly did not
pay) and Progressive was billed for half. Conjecture is not admissible evidence.
26

The argument that is oddly lacking is Judge Quinn's argument: "credibility."
Plaintiff will merely point out that her attorney's affidavit was fully corroborated by the
contents of the record. A trier of fact may not disregard unrebutted and sworn testimony
provided by an officer of the court based on the pretense of a "credibility" determination
when the testimony is corroborated by the court's own record. See, e ^ , Gittens v.
Lundberg, 284 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955).
27

The major personal injury firms are composed of about eight attorneys each.
The cost of their annual advertising is in the neighborhood of $2 million dollars. This
means that those personal injury firms need to make about $125 per hour simply to pay
for advertising. See http://deseretnews.eom/dn/view/0,1249,600128272,00.html
(revealing that the 10 members of a local p.i. firm average about $360 per hour).
16

Third, there was a substantial number of motions, memoranda and discovery. A
motion to compel discovery gave rise Progressive's payment of the benefits owed by Mrs.
Martinez to all other third-parties (besides her attorney). Progressive's assertion that there
were no motions and no discovery is not consistent with the record.28
Fourth, Progressive asserts there was no allocation, but that assertion is not true. See
EXHIBIT

C (R. 676). Mrs. Martinez apportioned compensable and non-compensable hours.

Moreover, no allocation is required under this fee-shifting statute where all the claims were
inextricably intertwined with a common core of facts. "[W]hen a plaintiff brings multiple
claims involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at least
some of its claims, it is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably
incurred in the litigation." Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App. 355, ^ 20,
993 P.2d 222.29
Finally, the nature of PIP benefits and the legal underpinnings of the statute are very
complex. The statute's lawful implementation would be simple, but Progressive's tortbased defenses, made-up defenses, and unsupported factual assertions make it very
28

The district court's conclusions can only be understood as the wholesale
adoption of Progressive's numerous misstatements of fact and law. But see Boyer Co. v.
Lignell 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977) (discouraging courts from mechanically adopting
findings of fact prepared and submitted by the prevailing party's attorney (i.e., delegating
rulings)).
29

It is true that Prince discussed abstract rules regarding allocation and affirmed
the arbitrary award based on a total failure to allocate; however, its analysis was based on
its refusal to apply the no-fault statute under its "mootness" ruling. Therefore, the dicta
from Prince is not binding. See, e.g.. Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v.
Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 592 n.5 (1993) (declaring statements in earlier cases dicta
because they were "uninvited, unargued, and unnecessary to the Court's holdings").
17

difficult. A careful examination of the complex underpinning of the statute reveals the
flaws inherent in Progressive's position.
VII.

"REASONABLE AND NECESSARY" IS A MIXED QUESTION OF
LAW AND FACT.

Progressive argues that it is clear that reasonable and necessary is a standard that
creates a question of fact regarding the meaning of material statutory terms. Opp. at p. 18.
It asserts that it would be defenseless30 if this were not so. IcL But Progressive provides the
Court with no guidance on how it purports to apply this standard to any particular claim or

30

Progressive strenuously repeats (e.g., Opp. at p. 24) that it should not have to
pay "when no loss was actually suffered" and "and without consideration of their
reasonableness or necessity." This illustrates Progressive's misunderstanding of the
difference between the insured's duty to complete the proof of loss forms required by
Section 31A-21-312 (proof of loss forms are to prove to the satisfaction of the contract
that a loss was actually suffered, and Progressive never disputed her proof of loss; it
merely attempted to mischaracterize the losses) and the very different possibility that it
might be able to prove an affirmative defense that is adequately explained in its policy.
"In terms of legal principles, this distinction resembles the distinction between a
'substantive' right, and the 'procedure' by which that right may be established or
enforced. This fundamental distinction between the loss, in fact, being within coverage,
and the manner by which the insured goes about establishing this to the insurer's
satisfaction, tends to get blurred with unfortunate frequency . . . . " Couch on Insurance
3d, §193:19 (emphasis added). It has long been the law: "When an insured claims a right
to recover under the accident provisions of the policy, all he need do is bring himself
within the field therein defined and show his injury or disability was proximately and
predominantly caused through violent, external and accidental means. He then has
brought himself within the policy, and the terms thereof have been met.... When he
brings himself within the insuring clause he has made his case . . . and any exceptions
or conditions which would then deny him relief, take him out of the indemnity provisions,
render them inoperative as to him, are matters of defense, and the burden thereof rests
upon the insurer
[Limitations, exceptions or conditions which may relieve the
insurer from liability, which may be set forth in the policy outside of the language of the
insuring clause, or which may exist outside of the policy entirely, must be made and
established by the insurer to escape liability thereunder." Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins.
Soc'v. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted).
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why it believes it can invoke this standard to deny benefits under coverages that omit this
standard.31 Id. at pp. 18-24. The facts in this case are undisputed. The absence of legal
rules that can be applied spawned these many years of litigation.
"Reasonable value" unquestionably limits a PIP carrier's obligation to pay more for
an insured's "all expenses" than the amount set forth in the relative value study. UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 31A-22-307(2). "Reasonably incurred" is not defined. "Necessary" medical

treatment is not defined. And there is no vague32 adjective for Progressive to rely on in the
lost wages coverage section. Are these adjectives objective? Are they qualitative? Do
they reserve discretion to one party or the other?33 Do they create evidentiary
presumptions? Can the existence of these adjectives render the 30-day payment obligation
meaningless?34 Are they merely warranties, descriptive terms, stipulations, conditions,35

31

No matter what other states have done with different no-fault statutes, the
contractual principle continues to apply: Progressive cannot make up conditions that
do not exist in the statute or contract. This is called "post-claim underwriting" and it is
unlawful. Progressive's assertions are "in blatant contravention of the express purpose of
the statute" to provide prompt and efficient indemnification. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted).
32

"When state action impinges on fundamental rights, strict compliance with due
process must be observed. A statute which affects fundamental liberties is
unconstitutional if it is so vague that 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning... .'" In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted); accord
Skaggs Drug Centers. Inc. v. Ashley, 484 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1971) (applying
vagueness doctrine to a civil matter).
33

But see R590-218 (prohibiting reservation of discretion clauses).

34

See Couch on Insurance 3d §189:64 at pp. 189-75, 76 ("Where a statute
requires payment within 30 days after receipt of reasonable proof of loss and amount of
expenses, it has been held that an automobile insurer could not require an insured to
submit all supporting medical records before the 30-day time period for payment of
19

exclusions, or exceptions? "Simple" this is not.36 But see Opp. at p. 17.
Judge Ambro of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided a helpful
analysis to be applied to this circumstance:
For example, imagine that a man is appealing his conviction under a
law that states "it is a crime to be tall." What kind of question is:
"Was the trial court correct to find the man 'tall'?" Can we answer it
solely by determining the facts of the case? No, because even if we
know the fact that the man is five feet ten inches, we do not know if he
is "tall" in the sense that Congress intended the word "tall" to
mean.[37] Can we answer it solely by determining what the relevant
law means without knowing the man's height? No, because even if we
know that the statute defines "tall" as "six feet or taller," we do not
know how tall the man is. Thus, we have a mixed question of fact and
law. Once we know the facts of the case (that the man is five feet ten
inches tall), and what the relevant law means (it is a crime to be six

personal injury protection benefits began to run by where defining "reasonable proof of
claim" to include all supporting medical records would allow the insurer to have
unilateral power to determine reasonable proof of loss thereby circumventing the
insurer's obligation to pay within 30 days and obliterating the period.").
35

See S & q Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996)
("S&G's argument does not withstand scrutiny. The change order could not have created
a condition precedent to a claim that had accrued ten months earlier."); Hertz v. Nordic
Ltd. Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 963 (Utah App. 1988) (stating "no one can avail himself of the
non-performance of a condition precedent, who has himself occasioned its nonperformance").
36

This should have been simple. See, e.g., Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635
P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981) (explaining that proof of loss for PIP household services
benefits requires that the insured "simply . . . show[ that the insured] was disabled....").
37

But see Prince, 2002 UT 68 at ^ 4 ("I do not think that..."). Dr. Marble
apparently "thought" treatment was "excessive." IdL at ^f 23. The legislature considered
"excessive" treatment and did not permit it as the basis for an exclusion. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31A-22-307(2)(d) ("Every insurer shall report to the commissioner any pattern
of overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions by a health provider
within 30 days after the insurer has knowledge of the pattern.") (emphasis added).
Patterns affect rate structures; individual treatments do not.
20

feet tall or taller), we can answer "no" to the question "Was the trial
court correct to find the man 'tall'?"
Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell International Inc.. Nos. 032760/3037/3585 (3rd Cir. February 18, 2005) (concurring) (emphasis added).
What did the legislature mean when it said that household expenses should be
"reasonably incurred"?38 Did it mean, as Progressive insists, that a jury should weigh the
evidence? How could a jury be convened to consider that question within 30 days? How
would the jury be instructed on the law?
First, "reasonably incurred" is not relevant because there are two alternative triggers
of coverage under the household expenses coverage. Plaintiff promised $20 per day to an
acquaintance to take care of her household. The alternative trigger "actually rendered" was
fully satisfied in 1997 and not subject to any "reasonable" defense.
Second, to the extent "reasonably incurred" is to be given effect, the issue is not
what Progressive, its adjuster or CorVel thinks. The issue is what the legislature meant.
Issues of statutory construction are not "questions of fact." Statutory construction is a pure
issue of law. Statutory terms such as "reasonably incurred" may not be interpreted to
undermine other parts of the statute. The 30 day payment obligation is predominant.39

38

See Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1374 (Utah App.), cert denied, 870 P.2d
957 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring in the result). The Court must also interpret the
statute in a reasonable way, with an eye toward the construction that will achieve the best
results in practical application. See Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah
App. 1990).
39

See, e^,, Gassman v. Dorius 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975) (Ellet, J. dissenting)
("There is no provision in the law for any delay.").
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A contractual defense may be raised by Progressive to avoid its obligations if, and
only if, the contours of the defense are explicitly delineated in the statutory contract.
Saying "clear" does not meet that standard. A defense consists of (1) definition; (2)
elements; (3) burden of proof; (4) quantum of proof; (5) evidentiary presumptions; (6) etc.
Comparing "reasonable" with "unreasonable" is incomprehensible. It is not a legal
test. It is not a valid contractual defense. It is not "clear" to a layman, an expert in
insurance law, or an appellate court judge. Instead, Progressive's assertion is frivolous.
For example, Progressive advertises its "low" premiums. May an insured refuse to
pay his premiums when due by saying that: "If I have to pay premiums that are 'low,' then
it is clear that I don't have to pay premiums that are 'excessive.' As such, Progressive must
sue me and prove that the premium is 'low' before I have to pay my premium"? One would
think that Progressive would object to being obligated to provide coverage for six to eight
years while such a "question of fact" was litigated with made-up-afterward defenses. In
fact, it would probably call such an argument "frivolous" because it is. And it is exactly the
same as Progressive's flawed adjudicatory syllogism.
A rule of law, whether preexisting or newly established, that serves as
the major premise of an adjudicatory syllogism, necessarily governs
all subsequent cases properly falling within the scope of the rule.
This is so even when the particular facts in subsequent cases are
different and res judicata does not apply.
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel.. 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992) (emphasis
added).
So what is the correct syllogism? Recognizing that Mrs. Martinez is not a 10-year-
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old boy; rather she is a wife of a man with two jobs and the mother of two young children,
the interplay between the dissent and the majority in Jamison is instructive:
How would the majority apply its ruling to the following fact situation:
The mother of five young children is injured. Her husband takes his
annual vacation and performs the mother's regular household duties.
As father and husband, he is equally responsible for the care of his
family. Should the mother recover the statutory allowance? What if
the family has three healthy teen-age daughters, who suffer from a
terminal case of laziness? The mother is injured, and the family
employs someone to clean the house and cook the meals. Should the
statutory allowance be denied because the daughters should have
performed these household services?
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1977) (Ellet, J. and
Maughan, J., dissenting*0). The majority responded as follows:
The dissent poses questions which are quite different from and
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"This is not an insurance act, per se, but a scheme analogous to the Workmen's
Compensation Act, wherein the legislature has determined that common law actions and
principles are inadequate to deal with the social problem. In response to social
conditions, the legislature has created an entirely new basis to compensate injured
persons; the Act should be so interpreted without reliance on the concepts of
traditional tort law." Id at 964. See also United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) (explaining that the parties' competing interests were
balanced by the legislative enactment of a two-tiered payment system requiring a
"definite limitation of $1,283.38 as the maximum award for any 'ordinary' case" and
"vests the commission with continuing supervision and control, which can be invoked as
either party may find it necessary, to make determinations as to the causal relationship,
necessity, reasonableness and justice of any extended award."). Under the no-fault
statute, by contrast, the legislature left tort law to deal with "extended awards" and
created PIP benefits to deal with "ordinary" cases. In addition, the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-111, expressly authorizes the use of
"Utilization Reviews" and the standards applicable thereto are set forth at R612-2-26 of
the Utah Administrative Code. Utilization reviews have not been adopted for use in the
no-fault statute.
23

therefore not involved here.[41] But in the interest of avoiding
misunderstanding, we respond: It would seem that in both examples
there would be reimbursement. In the first because they are the type of
services for which the family would reasonably incur expenses; and
the second because there would be actual expenditures for that type of
service. Whereas here, we have concluded that the minor tasks done
by Donald were not things for which the family would have
"reasonably incurred" expenses by hiring someone else to perform.
Id at n. 7. While Progressive selectively quotes (Opp. at p. 20) the abstract notion that
there should not be coverage if there was no loss, it wholly ignores the fact that Mrs.
Martinez did have a loss (i.e., an actual expenditure and status as mother and wife) and that
the case it relies on considered the situation presented by this case and both the majority
and the dissent indicated that such a situation would give rise to a right to receive
household services benefits — not a "question of fact" to be litigated for eight years in the
hope that its Mexican insured would give up and go away. See Pugh, 2000 UT App at n. 4.
Progressive insists that Plaintiff argues in favor of "unnecessary" reimbursement.
Opp. at 18. To the contrary, Plaintiff argues that there must be standards and criteria lest
the promise of PIP benefits be illusory. For example, a motorist may not travel at an
"unreasonable" speed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-47. This proscription is predicated on an
objective measure (miles per hour), it delineates time and location (the posted limit on the
particular stretch of road), it imposes a burden (on the state), and it defines an evidentiary
presumption {malum prohibitum). Progressive fails to address these fundamental principles
of jurisprudence. Instead, it underlines words in a fashion that renders its test

This means that Progressive should not represent that the Jamison case supports
its position when it actually stands for the opposite of Progressive's position.
24

ungrammatical and unlawful. Such a test only serves, in practice, to eliminate
Progressive's obligation to perform the contractual promises it made in exchange for a
premium.
CONCLUSION
Because Progressive provided no evidence rebutting Plaintiffs application for
attorney fees, this Court should enter a judgment in Plaintiffs favor for the fiilly supported
claim. Moreover, the Court should disabuse Progressive of its belief that it may deny PIP
claims by simply labeling them "unreasonable and/or unnecessary." Resolution of the
novel and complex features of this case will simplify future disputes. The Court should
remand this matter to the Third District Court for reassignment and an award of additional
attorney fees incurred for this appeal.
DATED this ^ s

day of April, 2005.
CARR& WADDOUPS

^RENT J. WADDOUI1

Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant
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Exkitit "A"

HIMmSTfliCTCMiT
Th'rd Judicial DlsfUct

M 0 9 233

Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657)
CARR & WADDOUPS
ATTORNEYS A T LAW, L L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
Fax: (801)363-8512
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
IRMA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,

;)

ORDER RE:
> PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
]> TO COMPEL

vs
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN
INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.

;) Civil No. 9 7 0 9 0 5 9 3 9 CV
; Judge Ronald E. Nehnng
)

The Plaintiff Irma Martinez's Motion to Compel Complete and Non-Evasive
Responses to Discovery having duly come before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehnng presiding
at the Third District Court, Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah on Monday, April 14, 2003 at the hour of 9:45 o'clock a.m., Plaintiff Irma
Martinez being represented by her attorney, Trent J. Waddoups, Defendant Progressive
Northwestern Insurance Company being represented by its attorney, Kristin VanOrman, the
Court having reviewed the file, having reviewed the parties' memoranda, having heard the

arguments of counsel, having reviewed the applicable court rules and legal precedent, being
fully informed in the premises, and for the reasons set forth by the Court in its ruling from the
bench, augmented by the agreement of the parties to resolve and settle a portion of their
underlying disputes and, by necessary implication, to dispose of the collateral discovery
disputes hereby orders as follows:
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that Plaintiff Irma Martinez's Motion to
Compel Complete and Non-Evasive Responses to Discovery be, and hereby is, granted, in
part. HOWEVER, this Order is HEREBY STAYED and superseded by the following:
The following settlement reached by the parties with the assistance of the Court shall
replace a plenary review of Plaintiff s Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs pending Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. The following stipulation is hereby entered as the Order of the
Court:
a.

Plaintiff will provide a letter from the employer of Plaintiff at the time of her

disability indicating the total amount of time she did not work following the April 14, 1997
and June 8, 1997 accidents and her rate of pay;
b.

Progressive will promptly pay the lost wages for the period set forth in the

employer's letter at the rate of 85% of her lost gross income or $250.00 per week, whichever
is lesser;
c.

Progressive will promptly pay the household expenses as previously set forth by

Plaintiff in her proofs of claim dated July 17, 1997 and September 15, 1997 at the rate of
2

$20.00 per day;
d.

Progressive will promptly pay the medical bills incurred as a result of the June

8, 1997 accident based on the bills it possesses;
e.

Progressive will pay interest accrued at the rate of 1 lA% per month determined

as simple interest on all payments to be made underffifb - d, supra, and Plaintiff reserves the
right to seek judicial clarification of her right to recover normal (a.k.a. compound) interest
and to recover the difference between simple interest and compound interest if the Court
rules that the interest provided by section 31 A-22-3 09(5) should be interpreted as normal
interest;
f.

Plaintiffs entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to section 31 A-22-309(5) will be

considered separately by the Court upon application by Plaintiffs counsel; and
g.

Progressive agrees that it will not argue or otherwise raise the defense that this

settlement was "not 'required by the action'" in the future proceedings regarding
reasonableness of attorney fees pursuant to section 31 A-22-309(5).
ORDERED this ^

day of AfJril, 2003.

^

H6NOI8§L^p' RONALD E. I ^ R I N G
DISTRICT tOURT JUEX&E

SUBMITTED this Q

day ofJAp^T, 2003.
CARR & WADDOUPS

TRENT J. WADDOUPS

Attorneys for Plaintiff Irma Martinez

AGREED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT this

day of April, 2003.

STRONG &HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant Progressive

Kristin A. VanOrman
STRONG & HANN1
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

i ^v

CLERK'S MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this

Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Trent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

COURT CLERK
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day of April, 2003, to:

Exkitit "B"

Code-Co's Internet Access to Utah Law: http://www.code-co.com
Code-Co QuickLinks:
[Home] [Utah Adv.Rep.] [Utah Code] [Legislature] [Ut.Adm.Code] [Courts] [CodeCo] [Subscribe]
(Utah Adminstrative Code as in effect on January 1, 2000)
[Search]
[Utah Administrative Code Table of Contents]
[Title R590. Table of Contents]
(R590. Insurance, Administration.)

R590-190. Unfair Property, Liability and Title
Claims Settlement Practices Rule.
R590-190-1 Authority.
R590-190-2 Purpose.
R590-190-3 Definitions.
R590-190-4 File and Record Documentation.
R590-190-5 Misrepresentation of Policy Provisions.
R590-190-6 Failure to Acknowledge Pertinent Communications.
R590-J9(t7 Notice of Claim or Loss.
R590-190-8 Proof of Loss.
R590-190-9 Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and Practices Defined.
R590-190-10 Minimum Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements.
R590-190-11 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to Automobile Insurance.
R590-190-12 Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Applicable to Automobile Insurance.
R590-190-13 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to Fire and Extended Coverage Type
Policies with Replacement Cost Coverage.
R590-190-14 Severability.

R590-190-1 Authority,
This rule is promulgated pursuant to Subsections 31A-2-201 (1) and 31A-2-201 (3)(a) in which the
commissioner is empowered to administer and enforce this title and to make rules to implement the
provisions of this title. Further authority to provide for timely payment of claims is provided by
Subsection 31A-26-301 (1). Matters relating to proof and notice of loss are promulgated pursuant to
Section 31A-26-301 and Subsection 31A-21-312 (5). Authority to promulgate rules defining unfair
claims settlement practices or acts is provided in Subsection 31A-26-303 (4). The authority to require a
timely response to the Insurance Department is provided in Section 31A-2-204.
R590-190-2 Purpose.
This rule sets forth minimum standards for the investigation and disposition of property, liability, and
title claims arising under contracts or certificates issued to residents of the State of Utah. It is not
intended to cover bail bonds. These standards include fair and rapid settlement of claims, protection for
claimants under insurance policies from unfair claims adjustment practices and promotion of
professional competence of those engaged in claim adjusting. This rule defines procedures and practices

which constitute unfair claim practices. This rule is regulatory in nature and is not intended to create any
private right of action.
R590-190-3 Definitions.
For the purpose of this rule the commissioner adopts the definitions as set forth in 31A-1-301 , and the
following:
(1) "Claim file" means any record either in its original form or as recorded by any process which can
accurately and reliably reproduce the original material regarding the claim, its investigation, adjustment
and settlement.
(2) "Claimant" means either a first party claimant, a third party claimant, or both and includes such
claimant's designated legal representative and includes a member of the claimant's immediate family
designated by the claimant.
(3) "Claim representative" means any individual, corporation; association, organization, partnership, or
other legal entity authorized to represent an insurer with respect to a claim, whether or not licensed
within the State of Utah to do so.
(4) "Days" means calendar days.
(5) "Documentation" includes, but is not limited to, any pertinent communications, transactions, notes,
work papers, claim forms, bills, and explanation of benefits forms relative to the claim.
(6) "First party claimant" means an individual, corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity
asserting a right to a benefit or a payment under an insurance policy or insurance contract arising out of
the occurrence of the contingency or loss covered by such policy or contract and includes such
claimant's designated legal representative and includes a member of the claimant's immediate family
designated by the claimant.
(7) "General business practice" means a pattern of conduct.
(8) "Investigation" means all activities of an insurer directly or indirectly related to the determination of
liabilities under coverages afforded by an insurance policy or insurance contract.
(9) "Notice of claim or loss" means any notification, whether in writing or other means acceptable under
the terms of an insurance policy or insurance contract, to an insurer or its agent, by a claimant, which
reasonably apprizes the insurer of the facts pertinent to a claim.
(10) "Proof of loss" shall mean reasonable documentation by the insured in accordance with policy
provisions and insurer practices as to the facts of the loss and the amount of the claim.
(11) "Specific disclosure" shall mean notice to the insured by means of policy provisions in boldface
type or a separate written notice mailed or delivered to the insured.
(12) "Third party claimant" means any person asserting a claim against any person under a policy or
certificate of an insurer.
R590-190-4 File and Record Documentation.

Each insurer's claim files for policies or certificates are subject to examination by the commissioner of
insurance or by the commissioner's duly appointed designees. To aid in such examination:
(1) the insurer shall maintain claim data that is accessible and retrievable for examination; and
(2) detailed documentation shall be contained in each claim file to permit reconstruction of the insurer's
activities relative to the claim.
R590-190-5 Misrepresentation of Policy Provisions.
(1) The insurer and its representatives shall fully disclose to first party claimants all pertinent benefits,
coverages or other provisions of an insurance policy or insurance contract under which a claim is
presented, including loss of use and household services.
(2) The insurer is prohibited from denying a claim based upon a first party claimant's failure to exhibit
the property unless there is documentation of a breach of the policy provision in the claim file.
R590-190-6 Failure to Acknowledge Pertinent Communications.
Within 15-days every insurer shall:
(1) upon receiving notification of a claim, acknowledge the receipt of such notice unless payment is
made within such period of time, or unless the insurer has a reason acceptable to the Insurance
Department as to why such acknowledgment cannot be made within the time specified. Notice given to
an agent of an insurer is notice to the insurer;
(2) provide a substantive response to a claimant whenever a response has been requested; and
(3) upon receiving notification of a claim, provide all necessary claim forms, instructions, and
reasonable assistance so that first party claimants can comply with the policy conditions and the insurer's
reasonable requirements.
R590-190-7 Notice of Claim or Loss.
(1) Notice of Claim or Loss to an insurer, if required, shall be considered timely if made according to the
terms of the policy, subject to the definitions and provisions of this rule, and the provisions of Section
31A-21-312.
(2) Notice of Claim or Loss may be given by an insured to any appointed agent, authorized adjuster, or
other authorized claim representative of an insurer unless the insurer clearly directs otherwise by means
of Specific Disclosure as defined herein.
(3) The general practice of the insurer when accepting a notice of loss or notice of claim shall be
consistent for all policyholders in accordance with the terms of the policy.
R590-190-8 Proof of Loss.
Proof of loss to an insurer, if required, shall be considered timely if made according to the terms of the
policy, subject to the definitions and provisions of this rule and the requirements of Section 31A-21-312.

R590-190-9 Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and Practices Defined.
The commissioner, pursuant to Section 31A-26-303 (4), hereby finds the following acts, or the failure to
perform required acts, to be misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory or overreaching in the
settlement of claims:
(1) denying or threatening the denial of the payment of claims or rescinding, canceling or threatening the
recission or cancellation of coverage under a policy for any reason which is not clearly described in the
policy as a reason for such denial, cancellation or rescission;
(2) failing to provide the insured or beneficiary with a written explanation of the evidence of any
investigation or file materials giving rise to the denial of a claim based on misrepresentation or fraud on
an insurance application, when such misrepresentation is the basis for the denial;
(3) compensation by an insurer of its employees, agents or contractors of any amounts which are based
on savings to the insurer as a result of denying the payment of claims;
(4) failing to deliver a copy of the insurer's guidelines, which could include the department's statutes,
rules and bulletins, for prompt investigation of claims to the Insurance Department when requested to do
so;
(5) refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation;
(6) offering first party claimants substantially less than the reasonable value of the claim. Such value
may be established by one or more independent sources;
(7) making claim payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by a statement or explanation
of benefits setting forth the coverage under which the payments are being made and how the payment
amount was calculated;
(8) failing to pay claims within 3 0-day s of properly executed proof of loss when liability is reasonably
clear under one coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy
coverage or under other policies of insurance;
(9) refusing payment of a claim solely on the basis of an insured's request to do so unless:
(a) the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic, military service, or other immunity from
suit or liability with respect to such claim; or
(b) the insured is granted the right under the policy of insurance to consent to settlement of claims.
(10) advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney or suggesting the claimant will receive
less money if an attorney is used to pursue or advise on the merits of a claim;
(11) misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations;
(12) requiring an insured to sign a release that extends beyond the occurrence or cause of action that
gave rise to the claims payment;
(13) deducting from a loss or claim payment made under one policy those premiums owed by the

insured on another policy, unless the insured consents;
(14) failing to settle a first party claim on the basis that responsibility for payment of the claim should be
assumed by others, except as may otherwise be provided by policy provisions;
(15) issuing checks or drafts in partial settlement of a loss or a claim under a specified coverage when
such check or draft contains language which purports to release the insurer or its insured from total
liability;
(16) refusing to provide a written basis for the denial of a claim upon demand of the insured;
(17) denying a claim for medical treatment after preauthorization has been given, except in cases where
the insurer obtains and provides to the claimant documentation of the pre-existence of the condition for
which the preauthorization has been given or if the claimant is not eligible for coverage;
(18) refusing to pay reasonably incurred expenses to an insured when such expenses resulted from a
delay, as prohibited by these rules, in claims settlement or claims payment;
(19) when an automobile insurer represents both a tort feasor and a claimant:
(a) failing to advise a claimant under any coverage that the same insurance company represents both the
tort feasor and the claimant as soon as such information becomes known to the insurer; and
(b) allocating medical payments to the tort feasor's liability coverage before exhausting a claimant's
personal injury protection coverage.
(20) failing to pay interest at the legal rate, as provided in Title 15, Utah Code, upon amounts that are
overdue under these rules. This does not apply to insurers who fail to pay Personal Injury Protection
expenses when due. These expenses shall bear interest as provided in 31A-22-309 (5)(c).
R590-190-10 Minimum Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements.
(1) The insurer shall provide to the claimant a statement of the time and manner in which any claim
must be made and the type of proof of loss required by the insurer.
(2) Within 3 0-day s after receipt by the insurer of a properly executed proof of loss, the insurer shall
complete its investigation of the claim and the first party claimant shall be advised of the acceptance or
denial of the claim by the insurer unless the investigation cannot be reasonably completed within that
time. If the insurer needs more time to determine whether a first party claim should be accepted or
denied, it shall so notify the first party claimant within 3 0-day s after receipt of the proofs of loss, giving
the reasons more time is needed. If the investigation remains incomplete, the insurer shall, within 45days after sending the initial notification and within every 45-days thereafter, send to the first party
claimant a letter setting forth the reasons additional time is needed for the investigation, unless the first
party claimant is represented by legal counsel or public adjuster. Any basis for the denial of a claim shall
be noted in the insurers claim file and must be communicated promptly and in writing to the first party
claimant. Insurers are prohibited from denying a claim on the grounds of a specific provision, condition,
or exclusion unless reference to such provision, condition or exclusion is included in the denial.
(3) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall promptly pay every valid insurance claim. A
claim shall be overdue if not paid within 3 0-day s after the insurer is furnished written proof of the fact

of a covered loss and of the amount of the loss. Payment shall mean actual delivery or mailing of the
amount owed. If such written proof is not furnished to the insurer as to the entire claim, any partial
amount supported by written proof or investigation is overdue if not paid within 30-days. Payments are
not deemed overdue when the insurer has reasonable evidence to establish that the insurer is not
responsible for the payment, notwithstanding that written proof has been furnished to the insurer.
(4) If negotiations are continuing for settlement of a claim with a claimant, who is not represented by
legal counsel or public adjuster, notice of expiration of the statute of limitation or contract time limit
shall be given to the claimant at least 60 days before the date on which such time limit may expire.
(5) Insurers are prohibited from making statements which indicate that the rights of a third party
claimant may be impaired if a form or release is not completed within a given period of time unless the
statement is given for the purpose of notifying the third party claimant of the provision of a statute of
limitations.
(6) Upon receipt of an inquiry from the insurance department regarding a claim, every licensee shall
furnish a substantive response to the insurance department within the time period specified in the
inquiry.
R590-190-11 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to Automobile
Insurance.
(1) When the insurance policy provides for the adjustments and settlement of automobile total losses for
first party claimants on the basis of actual cash value or replacement with another of like kind and
quality, one of the following methods must apply:
(a) the insurer may elect to offer a replacement automobile which is a specific comparable automobile
available to the insured, with all applicable taxes, license fees and other fees incident to transfer of
evidence of ownership of the automobile paid, at no cost other than any deductible provided in the
policy. The offer and any rejection thereof must be documented in the claim file;
(b) the insurer may elect a cash settlement based upon the actual cost, less any deductible provided in
the policy, to purchase a comparable automobile including all applicable taxes, license fees and other
fees incident to transfer of evidence of ownership of a comparable automobile. Such cost may be
determined by using:
(i) the cost of two or more comparable automobiles in the local market area when a comparable
automobile is available or was available within the last 90-days to consumers in the local market area;
(ii) the cost of two or more comparable automobiles in areas proximate to the local market area,
including the closest major metropolitan areas within or without the state, that are available or were
available within the last 90-days to consumers when comparable automobiles are not available in the
local market area pursuant to Subsection R590-190-11.(1 )(b)(i);
(iii) one of two or more quotations obtained by the insurer from two or more qualified dealers located
within the local market area when a comparable automobile is not available in the local market area; or
(iv) any source of determining statistically valid fair market values that meet all of the following criteria:
(A) the source shall give primary consideration to the values of vehicles in the local market area and

may consider data on vehicles outside the area;
(B) the source's database shall produce values for at least 85% of the makes and models for the last 15
model years, taking into account the values of all major options for such vehicles; and
(C) the source shall produce fair market values based on current data available from the area
surrounding the location where the insured vehicle was principally garaged or a necessary expansion of
parameters, such as time and area, to assure statistical validity.
(v) if the insurer is notified within 3 0-day s of the receipt of the claim draft that the first party claimant
cannot purchase a comparable vehicle for such market value, the company shall reopen its claim file and
the following procedure(s) shall apply:
(A) the company may locate a comparable vehicle by the same manufacturer, same year, similar body
style and similar options and price range for the insured for the market value determined by the
company at the time of settlement. Any such vehicle must be available through licensed dealers or
private sellers;
(B) the company shall either pay the difference between market value before applicable deductions and
the cost of the comparable vehicle of like kind and quality which the insured has located, or negotiate
and effect the purchase of this vehicle for the insured;
(C) the company may elect to offer a replacement in accordance with the provisions set forth in
Subsection R590-190-11.(1 )(a); or
(D) the company may conclude the loss settlement as provided for under the appraisal section of the
insurance contract in force at the time of the loss. The company is not required to take action under this
subsection if its documentation to the first party claimant, at the time of settlement, included written
notification of the availability and location of a specified and comparable vehicle of the same
manufacturer, same year, similar body style and similar options in as good or better condition as the
total loss vehicle which could be purchased for the market value determined by the company before
applicable deductions.
(c) when a first party claimant automobile total loss is settled on a basis which deviates from the
methods described in Subsections R590-190-11.(1 )(a) and (b), the deviation must be supported by
documentation giving particulars of the automobile condition. Any deductions from such cost, including
deductions for salvage, must be measurable, itemized and specified as to dollar amount and shall be
appropriate in amount. The basis for such settlement shall be fully explained to the first party claimant.
(2) Total loss settlements with a third party claimant shall be on the basis of the market value or actual
cost of a comparable automobile at the time of loss. Settlement procedures shall be in accordance with
Subsection R590-190-11.(1 )(b) and (c), except (b)(v) shall not apply.
(3) Where liability and damages are reasonably clear, insurers are prohibited from recommending that
third party claimants make a claim under their own policies solely to avoid paying claims under such
insurer's insurance policy or insurance contract.
(4) Insurers are prohibited from requiring a claimant to travel an unreasonable distance to inspect a
replacement automobile, to obtain a repair estimate or to have the automobile repaired at a specific
repair shop.

(5) Insurers shall include the first party claimant's deductible, if any, in subrogation demands initiated by
the insurer. Subrogation recoveries may be shared on a proportionate basis with the first party claimant
when an agreement is reached for less than the full amount of the loss, unless the deductible amount has
been otherwise recovered. The recovery shall be applied first to reimburse the first party claimant for the
amount or share of the deductible when the full amount or share of the deductible has been recovered.
No deduction for expenses can be made from the deductible recovery unless an outside attorney is
retained to collect such recovery. The deduction may then be for only a pro rata share of the allocated
loss adjustment expense. If subrogation is initiated but discontinued, the insured shall be advised.
(6) If an insurer prepares or approves an estimate of the cost of automobile repairs, such estimate shall
be in an amount for which it may be reasonably expected the damage can be satisfactorily repaired. If
the insurer prepares an estimate, it shall give a copy of the estimate to the claimant and may furnish to
the claimant the names of one or more conveniently located repair shops.
(7) When the amount claimed is reduced because of betterment or depreciation, all information for such
reduction shall be contained in the claim file. Such deductions shall be itemized and specified as to
dollar amount and shall be appropriate for the amount of deductions. The insurer shall provide a written
explanation of these deductions to the claimant upon request.
(8) When the insurer elects to repair and designates a specific repair shop for automobile repairs, the
insurer shall cause the damaged automobile to be restored to its condition prior to the loss at no
additional cost to the claimant other than as stated in the policy and within a reasonable period of time.
(9) Where coverage exists, loss of use payment shall be made to a claimant for the reasonably incurred
cost of transportation, or for the reasonably incurred rental cost of a substitute vehicle, including
collision damage waiver, unless the claimant has physical damage coverage available, during the period
the automobile is necessarily withdrawn from service to obtain parts or effect repair, or, in the event the
automobile is a total loss and the claim has been timely made, during the period from the date of loss
until a reasonable settlement offer has been made by the insurer. The insurer is prohibited from refusing
to pay for loss of use for the period that the insurer is examining the claim or making other
determinations as to the payability of the loss, unless such delay reveals that the insurer is not liable to
pay the claim. Loss of use payments shall be an amount in addition to the payment for the value of the
automobile.
(10) Subject to Subsections R590-190-11.(1) and (2), an insurer shall fairly, equitably and in good faith
attempt to compensate a claimant for all losses incurred under collision or comprehensive coverages.
Such compensation shall be based at least, but not exclusively, upon the following standards:
(a) an offer of settlement may not be made exclusively on the basis of useful life of the part or vehicle
damaged;
(b) an estimate of the amount of compensation for the claimant shall include the actual wear and tear, or
lack thereof, of the damaged part or vehicle;
(c) actual cash value, which shall take into account the cost of replacement of the vehicle and/or the part
for which compensation is claimed;
(d) an actual estimate of the true useful life remaining in the part or vehicle shall be taken into account in
establishing the amount of compensation of a claim; and
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(e) actual cash value, which shall include taxes and other fees which shall be incurred by a claimant in
replacing the part or vehicle or in compensating the claimant for the loss incurred.
(11) Insurers are prohibited from demanding reimbursement of personal injury protection payments
from a first-party insured of payments received by that party from a settlement or judgement against a
third party, except as provided by law.
(12) The insurer shall provide reasonable written notice to a claimant prior to termination of payment for
automobile storage charges and documentation of the denial as required by Section R590-190-4. Such
insurer shall provide reasonable time for the claimant to remove the vehicle from storage prior to the
termination of payment.
R590-190-12 Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Applicable to Automobile Insurance.
The commissioner, pursuant to Section 31A-26-303 (4), hereby finds the following acts, or the failure to
perform required acts, to be misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory or overreaching in the
settlement of claims:
(1) using as a basis for cash settlement with a claimant an amount which is less than the amount which
the insurer would be charged if repairs were made, unless such amount is agreed to by the claimant or
provided for by the insurance policy;
(2) refusing to settle a claim based solely upon the issuance of, or failure to, issue a traffic citation by a
police agency;
(3) failing to disclose all coverages for which an application for benefits is required by the insurer;
(4) failing in good faith to disclose all coverages, including loss of use, household services, and any
other coverages available to the claimant;
(5) requiring a claimant to use only the insurer's claim service in order to perfect a claim;
(6) failing to furnish the claimant, when requested, with the name and address of the salvage dealer who
has provided a salvage quote for the amount deducted by the insurer in a total loss settlement;
(7) refusing to disclose policy limits when requested to do so by a claimant or claimant's attorney;
(8) using a release on the back of a check or draft which requires a claimant to release the company from
obligation on further claims in order to process a current claim when the company knows or reasonably
should know that there will be future liability on the part of the insurer;
(9) refusing to use a separate release of a claim document rather than one on the back of a check or draft
when requested to do so by a claimant;
(10) intentionally offering less money to a first party claimant than the claim is reasonably worth, a
practice referred to as "low-balling;"
(11) refusing to offer to pay claims based upon the Doctrine of Comparative Negligence without a
reasonable basis for doing so; and

(12) imputing the negligence of a permissive user of a vehicle to the owner of the vehicle in a bailment
situation.
R590-190-13 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to Fire and
Extended Coverage Type Policies with Replacement Cost Coverage.
(1) Replacement Cost Value:
When the policy provides for the adjustment and settlement of first party losses based on replacement
cost, the following shall apply:
(a) when a loss requires repair or replacement of an item or part, any consequential physical damage
incurred in making such repair or replacements not otherwise excluded by the policy, shall be included
in the loss. The insured is only responsible for the applicable deductible; and
(b) when a loss requires replacement or repair of items and the repaired or replaced items do not match
in color, texture, or size, the insurer shall repair or replace items so as to conform to a reasonably
uniform appearance. This applies to interior and exterior losses. The insured is only responsible for the
applicable deductible.
(2) Actual Cash Value:
(a) When the insurance policy provides for the adjustment and settlement of losses on an actual cash
value basis on residential fire and extended coverage, the insurer shall determine actual cash value as the
replacement cost of property at the time of the loss less depreciation, if any. Upon the insured's request,
the insurer shall provide a copy of relevant documentation from the claim file detailing any and all
deductions for depreciation.
(b) In cases in which the insured's interest is limited because the property has nominal or no economic
value, or a value disproportionate to replacement cost less depreciation, the determination of actual cash
value, as set forth above, is not required. In such cases, the insurer shall provide, upon the insured's
request, a written explanation of the basis for limiting the amount of recovery along with the amount
payable under the policy.
R590-190-14 Severability.
If any provision or clause of this rule or its application to any person or situation is held invalid, such
invalidity may not affect any other provision or application of this rule which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this rule are declared to be
severable.
[Indexing] KEY: insurance law
July 28, 1999
[Editor's note: Below are references to the Utah Code that are listed by the agency making this rule as
authority for the rule.]
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[Home] [Utah.Adv.Rep.] [Utah.Code] [Ut.Adm.Code] [Legislature] [Courts] [Links] [CodeCo]
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
8 East Broadway, Suite 609
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
IRMA MARTINEZ,

;
>
;>

VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

vs.

]1

AND REQUEST FOR HEARING

PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN
INSURANCE CO.,

;
]1

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

)

Civil No. 9 7 0 9 0 5 9 3 9 CV
Judge Ronald E. Nehring

STATE OF UTAH
§
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Trent J. Waddoups, upon being sworn, duly acknowledges as follows:
1. Your affiant affirms that the Plaintiff is entitled to include attorney fees expended
in pursuing its cause of action against Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co. for failure to
pay PIP expenses in a timely manner as a measure of damages against Progressive
Northwestern pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(d) and as set forth by the Court
in its oral ruling on April 14, 2003 as being those hours related to the contract cause of

action, the entry of Judge Nehring's order granting Plaintiffs motion to compel complete and
non-evasive responses to discovery and Progressive's payment of the remainder of its
contractual obligations, but excluding hours spent on causes of action other than the breach
of the statutory contract.
2. The hours expended in this matter are set forth below:

RATE

DATE

ACTIVITY

TOTAL
HOURS

HOURS

1

$150.00

June 25, 1997

Representation letter to Progressive
Insurance

0.50

0.50

2

$150.00

June 26, 1997

2 letter to Progressive asking for client file

0.40

0.40

3

$150.00

June 26, 1997

Discussed "IME" issue with client

1.00

1.00

4

$150.00

June 30,1997

Reviewed acknowledgment letter from
Progressive Insurance

0.30

0.30

5

$150.00

June 30, 1997

Reviewed letter regarding wage benefits for
Irma

0.30

0.30

6

$150.00

June 30, 1997

Reviewed and discussed the letter with Irma
from State Farm Insurance to Irma regarding
that accident on April 14, 1997

0.80

0.80

7

$150.00

July 2, 1997

Reviewed letter from Progressive to Dennis
D.Theon regarding the PIP limits and that
they have been exhausted

0.60

0.60

8

$150.00

July 3, 1997

Sent out copies of Wasatch Endoscopy
Center bill to Progressive

0.30

0.30

9

$150.00

July 10, 1997

Reviewed letter from Progressive stating that
they have closed their PIP file

0.50

0.50

2

10

$150.00

July 15, 1997

Reviewed letter from Progressive to Dr.
Douglas requesting medical records

0.30

0.30

11

$150.00

July 17, 1997

Sent out copies of Dr.'s authorization for
absence to Progressive

0.30

0.30

12

$150.00

July 28, 1997

Prepared letter to Progressive stating that
they will pay the PIP expenses of Irma

0.60

0.60

13

$150.00

July 30, 1997

Reviewed letter from Progressive along with
photos. Waiting for medical records and
then CorVel will be notified for an
appointment

0.40

0.40

14

$150.00

July 31, 1997

research Utah PIP cases (no cases
interpreting purported "reasonable and
necessary" requirement) and applicability to
Progressive's assertions

7.70

7.70

15

$150.00

August 1,
1997

visit law library for law reviews (primarily
3.50
Keeton's 1973 Utah Law Review article) and
secondary sources

3.50

16

$150.00

August 1,
1997

review article I section 11 jurisprudence
related to interpretation of no-fault statute
(primarily Warren v. Melville and Malan v.
Lewis)

3.80

3.80

17

$150.00

August 4,
1997

TJW: Conference Carmen Doyle and
supervisor regarding payment of PIP benefits

0.30

18

$150.00

August 5,
1997

Prepared letter to Progressive regarding the
PIP expenses and clients policy

0.80

0.80

19

$150.00

August 7,
1997

Review seminal insurance coverage cases
(primarily Beck, Crookston, and Versluis)

4.00

4.00

20

$150.00

August 7,
1997

Research duties of insurers under PIP
2.50
coverage (primarily Ivie, Jamison, Brundage,
Warren); Get Rich Humphries Article on
duties

2.50

3

0.30

21

$150.00

August 7,
1997

Research confidential relationship cases re
burden of proving exclusions and
presumption of fraud

3.00

0.00

22

$150.00

August 8,
1997

Research; Find e.g. Jones v. Transamerica;
Write new Complaint

6.00

6.00

23

$500.00

August 11,
1997

Meet with client and explain representation
against Progressive and hourly rate
applicable to further action: $500.00 per
hour.

2.00

2.00

24

$500.00

August 11,
1997

Research Attorney Fee issue (cannot bill a
third for PIP)

2.00

2.00

25

$500.00

August 19,
1997

Prepared Complaint

3.00

3.00

26

$500.00

August 25,
1997

Reviewed letter from Progressive asking for
medical documents

0.20

0.20

27

$500.00

August 25,
1997

Reviewed letter to Irma from Progressive
with a check in the amount of $550.00 for
lost wages

0.20

0.20

28

$500.00

September 4,
1997

Filed with the court Service of Process

0.10

0.10

29

$500.00

September 9,
1997

Research physician patient relationship (find,
e.g., Mikkelsen v. Haslam)

1.50

1.50

30

$500.00

September 9,
1997

Research foreign state law (e.g., Dibassie
6.00
finding doctor's bill is "reasonable proof for
PIP benefits purposes in Kansas)

6.00

31

$500.00

September 15,
1997

Spoke with Irma regarding the letter and the
amount that Progressive paid

0.60

0.60

32

$500.00

September 16,
1997

Research employment law interpretations of
Beck's contract interpretation analysis (e.g.
Peterson v. Browning)

5.00

5.00

4

33

$500.00

September 26,
1997

Reviewed letter from Joseph Joyce, Attorney
for Progressive

0.30

0

34

$500.00

September 26,
1997

Prepared letter to Progressive requesting that
they pay the remained of the PIP expenses

0.40

0

35

$500.00

October 1,
1997

Reviewed letter from Progressive stating that
they have retained counsel and that we have
granted them an extension to answer
complaint

0.20

0

36

$500.00

October 15,
1997

Prepared letter to Irma, Written in Spanish

0.50

0

37

$500.00

October 17,
1997

Reviewed Amended Answer

0.80

0

38

$500.00

October 17,
1997

Reviewed Defendant's First Set of
Interrogatories to Plaintiff

0.50

0

39

$500.00

October 17,
1997

Translated Interrogatories into Spanish

2.00

2

40

$500.00

October 23,
1997

visit law library to read full foreign cases
cited by opposition and research underlying
structure of no-fault statutes for those states
and other prominent states

6.00

6

41

$500.00

October 23,
1997

research unilateral contracts and unilateral
interpretation of conditions

1.40

1

42

$500.00

November 4,
1997

Reviewed letter from Progressive

0.30

0

43

$500.00

November 26,
1997

Prepared letter to Joseph Joyce asking for an
extension of time to answer Interrogatories

0.30

0

44

$500.00

November 26,
1997

Prepared Ex-Parte Application and Order for
Leave to File and Over-Length
Memorandum

0.30

0

5

45

$500.00

November 26,
1997

Prepared Memorandum of Points and
Authorities of Plaintiff s Motion for
Summary Judgment; Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Request for Hearing

9

46

$500.00

December 29,
1997

Reviewed Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

1

47

$500.00

January 9,
1998

Prepared Reply Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

4

48

$500.00

January 9,
1998

Prepared Notice to Submit for Decision

0

49

$500.00

January 30,
1998

Reviewed Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

0

50

$500.00

February 4,
1998

Research and prepare standard of review for
Progressive's frivolous assertion that it was
entitled to a summary judgment because it
had "no evidence"

2

51

$500.00

February 4,
1998

Additional research on the point that it is
impossible to say that actions were "fairly
debatable" without knowing what actions
should have taken

3

52

$500.00

February 11,
1998

Meeting with Irma, for medical release form

0

53

$500.00

February 24,
1998

Prepared Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and
Notice of Hearing

2

54

$500.00

March 3, 1998

Reviewed Notice of Continuance for
Hearing of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary
Judgment

0

6

55

$500.00

March 25,
1998

Prepared letter to Court for Courtesy Copies

56

$500.00

March 26,
1998

Reviewed Reply Memorandum in Support of 0
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

57

$500.00

March 30,
1998

Reviewed fax letter from Joseph Joyce

58

$500.00

March 31,
1998

Prepared and Attended Hearing

59

$500.00

April 1, 1998

Reviewed Notice of Hearing

0

60

$500.00

April 6, 1998

Reviewed Notice of Reassignment

0

61

$500.00

May 5, 1998

Prepared letter to Dr. Black requesting
medical records

0

62

$500.00

June 17,1998

Prepared letter to Dr. Black asking for a
narrative report discussing his diagnosis

0

63

$500.00

July 14, 1998

Prepared fax letter to Progressive regarding a
judgment lien

64

$500.00

August 5,
1998

Prepared Notice of Hearing for Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

65

$500.00

October 2,
1998

Prepared letter to Dr. Wapner, asking for a
narrative report discussing his diagnosis

66

$500.00

November 2,
1998

Prepared Plaintiffs Responses to
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories

67

$500.00

November 3,
1998

Prepared letter to court along with Courtesy
Copies for the Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment

68

$500.00

November 3,
1998

Prepared Addendum to Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

7

0

0

69

$500.00

November 3,
1998

Research and preparation for Trial Brief

4.00

70

$500.00

November 6,
1998

Prepared and attended Hearing for Partial
Summary Judgment

3.50

3

71

$500.00

November 24,
1998

Reviewed letter from Kristin VanOrman
from Strong and Hanni regarding Order

0.20

0

72

$500.00

November 30,
1998

Prepared fax letter regarding Order and
changes that needed to be made

0.50

0

73

$500.00

December 2,
1998

Reviewed Order Granting Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment

0.50

0

74

$500.00

January 6,
1999

Paid for Bond

0.30

0

75

$500.00

January 8,
1999

Prepared Notice of Appeal and Notice of
Bond for Costs on Appeal

0.40

0

76

$500.00

January 14,
1999

Reviewed letter from Supreme Court
notifying that appeal has been received

0.40

0

77

$500.00

January 16,
1999

Prepared Request for Transcript

0.30

0

78

$500.00

January 22,
1999

Reviewed Transcript of Hearing

2.00

2

79

$500.00

January 26,
1999

Prepared Irma Martinez Docketing
Statement

1.00

1

80

$500.00

January 27,
1999

Reviewed letter from Supreme Court asking
to re-submit Docketing Statement

0.30

0

81

$500.00

February 5,
1999

Prepared Addendum to Docketing Statement

1.80

1

82

S500.00

March 8, 1999

Reviewed Supreme Court Order

0.40

0

8

83

$500.00

April 9, 1999

Reviewed Order of Dismissal

0.30

0.30

84

$500.00

February 10,
2000

Prepared Plaintiffs First Set of Request for
Admission, Interrogatories, and Request for
Production of Documents

2.50

2.50

85

$500.00

February 10,
2000

Prepared letter to Joseph Joyce regarding
settlement

0.20

0.20

86

$500.00

March 10,
2000

Reviewed Defendant's 2nd Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production
of Documents, translated into Spanish for
Plaintiff

1.30

1.30

87

$500.00

March 24,
2000

Reviewed Faxed information form Allstate
in which Allstate learned that Progressive
had reported 2nd accident to the CLUE
system (in which Mrs. Martinez was rearended) as an "at fault" accident preventing
them from being able to be insured.

0.30

0.30

88

$500.00

April 11,2000

Reviewed Withdrawal of Defendant's
Motion to Compel

0.20

0.20

89

$500.00

April 13, 2000

Reviewed letter form Kristin VanOrman

0.20

0.20

90

$500.00

September 14,
2000

Prepared Authorization to Represent, Issue
Class Action Lawsuit

0.80

0.00

91

$500.00

November 8,
2000

Prepared letter to Kristin VanOrman
regarding interrogatories

0.30

0.30

92

$500.00

November 8,
2000

Prepared Plaintiffs Responses to
"Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories
and Request for Production of Documents"

2.60

2.60

93

$500.00

November 9,
2000

Reviewed Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Compel

0.40

0.40

94

$500 00

November 9,
2000

Prepared Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Request for
Hearing; Research

4.60

4.60

9

95

$500.00 November 9,
2000

Prepared Amended Complaint

3.00

0.00

96

$500.00 November 9,
2000

Prepared Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Plaintiffs
Complaint

1.00

0.00

97

$500.00 November 9,
2000

Prepared Plaintiff s Ex-Parte Application fro 0.40
the Filing of an Over-Length Memorandum

0.00

98

$500.00 November 9,
2000

Reviewed letter from Kristin VanOrman
regarding discovery

0.30

0.30

99

$500.00 November 10,

Prepared letter to Court

0.20

0.20

2000

100

$500.00 November 9,
2000

Prepared Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

6.70

6.70

101

$500.00 November 22,
2000

Reviewed Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Motion to Amend the
Complaint

0.70

0.70

102

$500.00 November 27,
2000

Prepared Plaintiff s Responses to
"Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories
and Request for Production of Documents"

1.80

1.80

103

$500.00

Reviewed Notice to Submit

0.20

0.20

November 29,
2000

104

$500.00 November 30,
2000

Prepared Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Compel

1.30

1.30

105

$500.00

Prepared Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Complete and
Non-Evasive Responses to Discovery

1.50

1.50

December 1,
2000

10

106

$500.00

December 4,
2000

Prepared Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; Prepared Plaintiffs ExParte Application for the Filing of an OverLength Memorandum

7

107

$500.00

December 13,
2000

Reviewed Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel

0

108

$500.00

December 22,

Prepared Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff s Motion to Compel
Complete and Non-Evasive Responses to
Discovery

1

Prepared Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Amend Plaintiffs Complaint

3

2000

Prepared letter to Court

0

Reviewed Minute Entry

0

Reviewed letter, and Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Compel
Reviewed Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss
Prepared Notice to Submit for Decision

0

2000

109

$500.00

December 22,
2000

110

$500.00

December 22,

111

$500.00

January 8,
2001

112

$500.00

January 15,
2001

113

$500.00

January 30,
2001

114

$500.00

January 31,

0
0

2001

115

$500.00

February 1,
2001

Prepared Plaintiffs Supplemental Responses
to "Defendant's Second Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production
of Documents"

1

116

$500.00

February 1,
2001

Prepared Affidavit of Trent J. Waddoups

0

11

117

$500.00

February 1,
2001

118

$500.00

119

Prepared Plaintiff s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding the Requirement of "Reasonable
and Necessary"

5.00

5.00

March 8,2001 Reviewed Minute Entry

0.30

0.30

$500.00

March 15,
2001

Reviewed Notice to Submit

0.20

0.20

120

$500.00

July 9,2001

Reviewed Minute Entry

0.50

0.50

121

$500.00

July 11, 2001

Reviewed Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion
to Amend

0.40

0.40

122

$500.00

July 25, 2001

Prepared Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's
Proposed Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion for a
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to
Amend and Request for Pretrial Conference

1.80

1.80

123

$500.00

December 20,
2002

Reviewed Offer of Judgment

0.30

0.30

124

$500.00

January 22,
2003

Reviewed Request for Scheduling
Conference

0.20

0.20

125

$500.00

January 23,
2003

Called Irma to set up a date and time to have
her deposition taken and to give status of
case

0.50

0.50

126

$500.00

January 31,
2003

Reviewed Notice of Deposition

0.20

0.20

127

$500.00

February 19,
2003

Prepared Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Liability for PIP Household Expenses

2.50

2.50

128

$500.00

February 20,
2003

Prepared letter to court

0.20

0.20

12

129

$500.00

February 21,
2003

Spoke with Kristin VanOrman

0

130

$50ftOO

February 23,

Reviewed letter from Kristin VanOrman

0

Discussed status of case with Client

0

2003

131

$500.00

February 28,
2003

132

$500.00

March 19,
2003

Prepared Second Notice to Submit for
Decision and Request for Hearing

0

133

$500.00

March 26,

Prepared letter to Irma Martinez

0

2003

134

$500.00

April 11,2003

Reviewed Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

0

135

$500.00

April 14,2003

Prepared and Attended Hearing for Partial

3

Summary Judgment
136

$500.00

April 15,2003 Reviewed Irma Martinez's payroll

0

137
138

$500.00 April 16, 2003 Discussed status of case with client
$500.00 April 16, 2003 Prepared Order Re: Plaintiff s Motion to
Compel and forwarded it Krisin VanOrman
for Review

0
0

139

$500.00

May 6, 2003

Prepared letter to Court regarding Order Re:
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel

0

140

$500.00

May 20, 2003

Reviewed letter from Strong & Hanni
regarding the settlement amount excluding
attorney's fees

0

141

$500.00

May 27, 2003

Reviewed Release of All Claims form and
discussed the form with client

1

142

$500.00

June 6, 2003

Reviewed letter to Court regarding Motion
and Stipulation to Dismiss and Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice

0

13

TOTAL HOURS

189.80

170.20

3. The foregoing time was reasonably expended.
4. The rates charged are reasonable for comparable legal services given the expertise
required, the risk involved, the unsettled status of the law, and the nature of oppressive,
stubborn, and vexatious defensive tort-based assertions.
5. The applicable rates are $150.00 per hour before litigation was begun and $500.00
per hour thereafter.
6. The hours spent on the Breach of Contract cause of action are 170.20.
7. The hours representing work relating to other causes of action for which attorney
fees would have been recoverable if they had been successful are approximately 12.20.
8. The hours representing work relating to causes of action for which no attorney
fees would be available are approximately 7.40.
9. Plaintiffs attorney fees which are recoverable from Defendant under section 309
as set forth above are the sum of $72,885.00.
10. WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that a final judgment be entered against this
defendant and in favor of plaintiff for an award of attorney fees in the sum of $72,885.00.
11. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiff
hereby requests a hearing on this application.

14

DATED this ^

day of December, 2003.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOTARY CLAUSE
On this Q

day of December, 2003, personally appeared before me Trent J.

Waddoups who, being duly sworn, did say that he is an attorney for the Plaintiff named
herein, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said Plaintiff by him, the foregoing is
true to the best of his knowledge and belief, and said Trent J. Waddoups acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this ,^
Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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day of December, 2003, to:

ExUit "D"

IRMA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS
PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
JANUARY 3, 2005
INDEX
DISTRICT COURT NO. 970905939
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 20040799-CA
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
DATE
FILED
08/20/97
09/10/97
10/21/97
10/21/97
12/01 /97
12/01/97
12/01/97

12/31191
01/12/98
01/12/98
02/02/98
02/26/98
02/26/98

03/05/98
03/26/98

DOCUMENT
COMPLAINT
SUMMONS
AMENDED ANSWER
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
REQUEST FOR HEARING
EX-PARTE APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AN OVER-LENGTH MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOTICE OF HEARING
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 1

PAGE
NUMBERS
1-9
10-11
12-21
22-23
24-25
26-29
30-83

84-109
110-124
125-126
127-146
147-148
149-177

178-179
180-188

IRMA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS
PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
JANUARY 3, 2005
INDEX
DISTRICT COURT NO. 970905939
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 20040799-CA
DATE
FILED
03/31/98
04/06/98
08/07/98
11/04/98
11/04/98
11/04/98

11/04/98
11/04/98

11/06/98
11/23/98
12/10/98

01/08/99
01/08/99
01/14/99
01/22/99
04/13/99
02/14/00
03/06/00
03/13/00
11/09/00

DOCUMENT
MINUTES - SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT
NOTICE OF HEARING
TRIAL BRIEF
TRIAL BRIEF
ADDENDUM TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ADDENDUM TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MINUTES - MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MINUTES - LAW & MOTION
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOTICE OF APPEAL
NOTICE OF BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL
SUPREME COURT LETTER TO TRENT J. WADDOUPS
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT
REMITTITUR
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Page 2

PAGE
NUMBERS
189-190
191-192
193-194
195-218
219-242
243-252

253
254-263

264
265
266-267

268-269
270-273
274-275
276-277
278-280
281
282-283
284-285
286

IRMA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS
PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
JANUARY 3, 2005
INDEX
DISTRICT COURT NO. 970905939
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 20040799-CA
DATE
FIL^D
11/13/00
11/13/00
nmjOO
11/13/00
11/13/00
11/13/00
11/14/00
11/14/00
11/27/00
11/27/00
11 /28/00
12/01/OQ
12/05/00
12/05/00

DOCUMENT
MOTION TO AMEND PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
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Exhibit "E"

The Recovery of Attorney Fees in Utah:
A Procedural Primer1 for Practitioners - Part I
By James E. Magleby
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the University of Utah Law
Review published a symposium2 which
summarized the state of Utah law3 on the
recovery of attorney fees4 which contained
a brief discussion of the procedural aspects
af the process.5 Although Utah law on the
subject has developed substantially since
1984, the procedural aspects of the recovery of attorney fees are often overlooked
by courts and practitioners alike.6 Accordingly, this article attempts to reduce the
confusion by providing an overview of the
procedural aspects of pleading and recovering attorney fees in Utah and surviving
appellate challenge to the award.7

mechanics lien statute, although the issue had
not been raised in the original complaint.14
In doing so, the Supreme Court ruled:
The fact that there was no specific
pleading in that regard does not preclude such an award. It is indeed
important that the issue be raised and
that the parties have full opportunity
to meet it. But when that is done, our
rules indicate that there shall be
liberality of procedure to reach the
result which justice requires. Rule
1(a), [Utah Rules of Civil Procedure],
provides that they shall be "liberally
construed" to secure a "just . . .
determination of every action and
Rule 54(c)(1) provides " . . . every
II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
final judgment shall grant the relief
JAMES E. MAGLEBY graduated from Swartha. Pleading
more College with Honors in 1989. He then
to which the party . . . is entitled,
spent three years in San Francisco as a legal
Although it may appear obvious, practieven if the party has not demanded
assistant, specializing in the preparation of
tioners have, on occasion, failed to request
such relief in his pleadings.15
computerized databases for use in national litan award of attorney fees in the pleadings.
Other rules have been construed in similar
igation in the areas of products liability and
Such an omission can have dire consemanner to reach similar results. Rule 8(e)
insurance defense. Jim received his J.D. from
the University of Utah College of Law in
quences, as a party who fails to raise the
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure con1995, and was admitted to the Order of the
issue of attorney fees until late in the protains the "notice pleading" rule which
Coif upon graduation. He was admitted to the
ceedings may be precluded from
provides that "no technical forms of pleadUtah State Bar in October of1994.
recovering fees at all. This position was
ings or motions are required."16 This rule
Jim is the author of Hospital Mergers and
first taken in Leger Construction, Inc. v.
has been applied to allow recovery of attorAntitrust Policy: Arguments Against a ModifiRoberts, Inc.,* where the court declined to cation of Current Antitrust Law, 21 The
ney fees where the opposing party was
Antitrust Bulleting 137 (1996), and The Conaward attorney fees because the statute
"clearly on notice" that fees were sought,
stitutionality of Utah's Medical Malpractice
under which fees were sought was not pled
albeit by imperfect pleading." Trial courts
Damages Cap Under the Utah Constitution,
in the original pleadings.9 The court noted
have discretion to take evidence on attor21 The Journal of Contemporary Law 217
that, at least with regard to a request for
ney fees at trial under Utah Rule of Civil
(1995). Jim is also the co-author of a book
attorney fees under statutory authority,
commissioned by the Utah Bar Foundation,
Procedure 15(b),18 even if the parties did
Justices of the Utah Supreme Court 1896-1996, not raise the issue in the'pleadings.19 Nor
"one entitled [to attorney fees under a
consisting of a biographical survey of all past
statute], in fairness, should make his claim
do the pleadings limit the amount of fees
and present Utah Supreme Court Justices.
10
20
known in his pleadings." Although this
recoverable,
unless they are awarded purAfter law school, Jim clerked for the Honstatement was couched m mere observasuant to a default judgment.21
orable Pamela T Greenwood of the Utah
Court of Appeals for one year, from August
tion," the rule in practice is that attorney
From these cases, it appears that where
1995 through September 1996, when he joined
fees which are not requested in the pleada party has failed to request attorney fees
the Salt Lake City office of Jones, Waldo, Holings will not be awarded.12
in the initial pleadings, as long as "the
brook & McDonough. The focus of his
However, if the issue of attorney fees is
issue be raised and. . . the parties have full
practice is litigation.
raised before the trial court and the other
opportunity to meet it,"22 particularly where
party placed on notice, Utah courts appear
the opposing party is "clearly on notice,"23
13
willing to interpret the rules of procedure D.C. Builders, the Utah Supreme Court Utah courts will probably allow recovery
liberally to allow a fee award. In Palombi v. upheld an award of attorney fees under the of attorney fees despite a failure to conVoi 9 No. 10

brm to a specific pleading format. Thereore, a practitioner who has inadvertently
ailed to plead attorney fees, or is not entiled to do so until the case has progressed,24
hould (1) take steps to bring the issue
)efore the court and (2) place opposing
ounsel on notice that fees are an issue.
In pleading attorney fees, practitioners
nust decide the grounds upon which attorley fees will be sought, whether they be
tatutory, contractual or equitable.:> Next,
he practitioner must decide the approprite method for pleading the grounds upon
/hich attorney fees are sought. The pracce in Utah varies, with some preferring to
squest attorney fees in the prayer for
ilief, rather than as separate claim.26 Intuively, this may make sense as attorney
*es are usually awarded after the conclulon of the lawsuit,27 in temporal proximity
) an award of damages. Another approach
; to plead attorney fees as a separate
laim.28 This method seems particularly
ppropriate where the request is based
pon a statute or other rule which requires
le party requesting fees to produce proof
n discrete issues.29
, Burden of Proof
Once recovery of attorney fees is
lowed,30 "[a] party requesting an award of
torney fees has the burden of presenting
ddence sufficient to support the award."31
party which does not provide such evin c e , even if indisputably entitled to
cover attorney fees, may not recover at
l,32 even if there is no disputed issue of
aterial fact.33
Various types of evidence may be suffient to meet this burden. Generally,
sufficient evidence should include the
>urs spent on the case, the hourly rate
arged for those hours, and the usual and
stomary rates for such work."34 This evince should probably be submitted by
Idavit,35 although testimony36 by counsel
r the party requesting attorney fees is
lowed.37 Practitioner should beware
liance solely upon their own opinion,
wever, as "[e]ven [if the] evidence is
disputed, the trial judge [is] not necesrily compelled to accept such
f-interested testimony whole cloth and
ike . . . an award."38
The simplest way for a practitioner to
iet the initial evidentiary burden is to file
affidavit in compliance with Rule 4-505
the Utah Code of Judicial Administran. Rule 4-505, designed "[t]o establish

uniform criteria and a uniform format for
affidavits in support of attorney[] fees,**'9
provides:
1) Affidavits in support of an award
of attorneys fees must be filed with the
court and set forth specifically the
legal basis for the award, the nature of
the work performed by the attorney,
the number of hours spent to prosecute
the claim to judgment, or the time spent
in pursuing the matter to the stage for
which attorney [] fees are claimed, and
affirm the reasonableness of the fees
for comparable legal services.
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other
than attorneys, for time spent, work
completed and hourly rate billed.40
Although Rule 4-505 does not require the
inclusion of an hourly rate for each attorney
working on the case,41 such information
should probably also be included as "an hourly
rate would likely be helpful to the court."42

". . . the party requesting
attorney fees is often entitled
to fees incurred in pursuing only
some portions of the lawsuit

Once the initial burden of production is
met, opposing counsel has the opportunity to
investigate the evidence supporting the
claimed fees. Although the procedure is
meant to be informal, practitioners opposing
an attorney fee award may challenge the evidence, and the trial court is obligated to act
"so that procedural fairness will be accorded
one who opposes a requested award."43 The
Supreme Court has summarized its position
regarding the nature of this process:
Although we do not intend to turn fee
award determination into satellite litigation with full scale discovery,
thereby increasing the overall cost of
litigation, an adversary-type mechanism through which an opponent to a
fee request can examine the accuracy
of factual assertions underlying the
request must be available. Usually, it
will be sufficient if the opponent is
provided access to supporting documents such as attorney time records. If

necessary, however, a party should
have an opportunity to contest the
accuracy of the documents by either
counter-affidavit or cross-examination of the opposing attorney before
the court. Full-blown discovery
should rarely be necessary.44
Accordingly, practitioners should take
advantage of the procedural protections,
and investigate any request for attorney
fees. In particular, inquiry should be conducted to insure that the requested fees
have been properly allocated,45 and meet
the evidentiary 46 and reasonableness 47
requirements discussed in this article. Failure to investigate, and dispute, at least
some of the evidence presented in support
of the request for attorney fees creates the
risk of summary adjudication in favor of
the party requesting the fees.48 However, if
a party has failed to provide the court with
sufficient evidence, or failed to properly
allocate between the recoverable and nonrecoverable fees may result in a denial of
the fee award altogether.49
c. Allocation of fees
Practitioners should also be aware of the
rule50 that "[a] party is . . . entitled only to
those fees resulting from its principle cause
of action for which there is a contractual
(or statutory) obligation for attorney[]
fees."51 In other words, the party requesting
attorney fees is often entitled to fees
incurred in pursuing only some portions of
the lawsuit, as authorized by statute, contract, or equity. For example, attorney fees
awarded under the terms of a contract may
not allow recovery of all the fees generated
in the lawsuit.52 Similarly, attorney fees
awarded under a statute will not allow an
award of fees incurred in pursuit of common law, or other statutory claims.53
In the event a party is entitled to only
some of the legal fees incurred, the practitioner requesting attorney fees has the
burden of allocating fees between the various claims. The Utah Supreme Court has
summarized:
One who seeks an award of attorney
fees must set out the time and fees
expended for (1) successful claims
for which there may be an entitlement
to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful
claims for which there would have
been an entitlement to attorney fees
had the claims been successful, and
(3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees.54

A party who fails to allocate attorney fees
between those which are recoverable, and
those which are not, may forfeit the award
entirely,55 at the trial court's discretion.56
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Utah R Civ P 8(e) Other rules call for similar results,
although they have not yet been used by Utah courts to allow an
award of attorney fees See, eg Utah R Civ P 8(f) ("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice "), Utah R
Civ P 15(a) ("[A] party may amend his pleading only by leave
of the court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave
shall be freely given ") (emphasis added), Id ("A party may
amend his pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served, "or, if no responsive pleading is allowed,
"within 20 days after it is served "), Utah R Civ P 15(d) (allowing filing of supplemental pleadings, noting "[permission [to
file a supplemental pleading] may be granted even though the
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief
or defense") (emphasis added)

*A pnmer is defined as "a small introductory book on a subject" Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 934 (1986)
This definition reflects that this article is not meant to be the
complete word on its subject, but rather a review of the procedures for recovering attorney fees in Utah
2
See generally 1984 Utah Law Review 533-669 (1984)
3
See Kelli L Sager, Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L
Rev 553-571 (1984)

11
Sears v Riemersma, 655 P 2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982) (allowing party who requested attorney fees in counterclaim, but not in
answer, to recover fees incurred in defending lawsuit because the
other parties "were clearly on notice that [attorney fees] be
awarded in connection with the dismissal of [the] complaint")

4

The terminology for this phrase vanes and has included
"attorneys' fees," "attorney's fees," "attorney fee" and "attorney fees " Because the Utah courts seem to have settled upon
the nomenclature "attorney fees," this is the phrase used in this
article See, eg Salmon v Davis County, 916 P2d 890 (1996)

18

5

Supra Note 4 at 563-65

"Despite the focus of the 1984 symposium, the issue of attorney fees is often ignored or given only cursory treatment by
both practitioners and the courts As the Utah Supreme Court
has noted, "[i]n many instances, where the question arises at
all, the attorney fee issue is treated as incidental by the appellant, who focuses on more substantial issues, and has accordingly tended to receive the same kind of cursory treatment by
us " Dixie State Bank v Broken, 764 P2d 985, 989 n 6 (Utah
1988) This problem is compounded by the often confusing, or
even contradictory, statements in Utah case law See, eg,
notes 96 through 98 and accompanying text
^Traditionally, Utah appellate courts have "generally reviewed
a trial judge's decision on the issue of attorney fees for abuse
of discretion " Salmon, supra note 4 at 892 However, in State
v Pena, 869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court
clarified that in some cases the appropriate standard of review
would be a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore
require a somewhat different standard of review Id at 935-39
Since then, the appropriate standard of review for an award of
attorney fees has been subject to some debate Justice Durham
now takes the position that "[i]n light of
[Pena] the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees ordinarily presents a
question of law, with some measure of discretion given to the
trial court in applying the reasonableness standard to a given
set of facts " Id at 893 (Durham, J , lead opinion) However,
Justice Durham may be alone in this approach Id at 897-98
(disputing that Pena calls for a change in the standard of
review for an award of attorney fees) (Russon, J , joined by
Justice Howe, dissenting), id at 900 (Zimmerman, C J , concurring "in Justice Russon's articulation of the proper standard
of review for a trial court's award of attorney fees
"), id
at 900 (Stewart J , making no comment on Justice Durham's
argument)
8
550P2d 212 (Utah 1976)
9
Id at 215 Attorney fees were also not requested until after
judgment was entered, and the request came one day before
the time for filing a motion to amend expired Id It is unclear
from the decision how much weight, if any, the court gave to
this consideration

* *The court noted that "[ajlbeit we say m fairness [a request
for attorney fees in the pleadings] should be done we need not
and do not decide that point" Id
' 2See e g Christensen v Farmers Insurance Exchange 669
P2d 1236, 1239 (Utah 1983) (denying a request for attorney
fees because, in part, "a review of the pleadings on file does
not reflect any claim for attorney fees"), cf Projects
Unlimited v Copper State Thrift 798 P2d 738 753 n 18 (Utah
1990) (declining to award attorney fees to bank which was
statutorily entitled to fees where bank 'did not request attor
ney fees as part of its motion for summary judgment '),
Cabrera v Cottrell 694 P2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985) (declining
to award attorney fees on appeal where prevailing party 'has
not sought them")
,3

452P2d 325 (Utah 1969)

^However, attorney fees could not have been raised in the
original complaint, as the mechanics lien statute was not
raised until the defendant contractor raised the statute by filing
a counterclaim Id at 327 It is unclear from the decision how
much weight, if any, the court gave to this consideration

12

Id at 328 (footnote omitted) (partial emphasis added)
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Rule 15(b) states, m relevant part
If evidence is objected to at the dial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him m maintaining his action
or defense on the merits
Utah R Civ P 15 Because it is unlikely that an award of attorney fees would prejudice an objecting party on the merits, a
practitioner should almost always be able to argue that the issue
of attorney fees may be raised as late as trial However, the decision is within the trial court's discretion, see infra note 8, and
care should therefore be taken no to rely upon this approach
unless absolutely necessary
^Redevelopment Agency v Daskalas, 785 P2d 1112, 1125
(Utah 1989) (holding that "the trial court was within its discretion in concluding that the pleadings could be amended to
include attorney fees, even though not initially raised m the
pleadings")
20

Pope v Pope, 589 P2d 752, 753 (Utah 1978) ("[U]nder [Rule
54(c)(1), an award of attorney[] fees in excess of that requested
in the pleadings, is allowable where the proof shows the party to
be entitled to it"), Ferguson v Ferguson, 564 P2d 1380, 1383
(Utah 1977) (same), see also Utah R Civ P 54 (c)(1) ("[E]very
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings ")
21

Pope, 589 P2d at 753, Ferguson, 564 P2d at 1383, see also
Utah R Civ P 54(c)(1) ("Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled ") (emphasis added)
22

Palmobi, supra note 13 at 328

23

Sears, supra note 17 at 1110

2
^Such as in Palombi, supra note 13 at 328, where plaintiff was
not allowed to seek recovery under the mechanics lien statute,
but was allowed to recover fees as a prevailing party once defendant raised a counterclaim under the statute
2

-*"It has long been established that "[t]he general rule in Utah,
and the traditional American Rule, subject to certain exceptions,
is that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party
unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award " Stewart v
Utah Public Service Com n, 885 P2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994)
However, recent decisions by the Utah courts may indicate an
increased willingness to consider equitable grounds for awarding attorney fees See id at 782 (recognizing inherent power of
courts to award fees where party acts in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly or for oppressive reasons) id at 783 (recognizing
power of court to award fees under common fund theory), id
(recognizing power of court to award fees under private attorney
general theory), see also Jensen v Bowcut 892 P2d 1053, 1059
(Utah App 1995) (affirming an award of attorney fees based on
principles of equity and justice as they relate to the specific cir
cumstances of this case '), Saunders v Sharp 840 P2d 796 09
(Utah App 1992) (noting that 'courts may, in some situations
award attorney tees on an equitable basis )
26
This conclusion is based upon the author s own observations
and those of a number of practitioners in Salt Lake City, Utah
2

'There are exceptions, such as an award of attorney fees for
failure to comply with discovery requests, or Rule 11 sanctions
See Utah R Civ P 37 ("If the motion [to compel compliance

with a discovery request] is granted, the court shall
requir
the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion
to pay
the reasonable expenses incurred
mcludin<
attorney fees
"), Utah R Civ P 11 ("If a [court paper] i
singed in violation of this rule, the court
shall impose
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
a reasonable attorney fee")
conclusion is based upon the author's own observation
and those of a number of practitioners in Salt Lake City, Utah
29
See, eg, Utah Code Ann §78-27-56 (1992) (awardin
attorney fees to a prevailing party where action was withou
merit or brought in bad faith), see also Hermes Assocs i
Park's Sportsman, 813 P2d 1221, 1225 (Utah App 1991
(requiring proof of three discrete elements before attorney fee
may be awarded under §78-27-56)

-^After pleading attorney fees, the parties must obviously lit
igate the right to attorney fees This step is beyond the scop
of this article
3*Salmon, supra note 4 at 893 This has been the explicit nil
in Utah since at least 1945 See Mason v Mason, 160 P 2d 730
733 (1945)
32
See, e g Dixie, supra note 6 at 988, see also Regional Sale
Agency, Inc v Reichart, 784 P2d 1210, 1126 (Utah App con
stitutes an abuse of discretion and must be overruled")
Bangerter v Poulton, 663 P2d 100, 103 (Utah 1983) ("[T]h
award of the trial court of attorney's fees and certain costs I
not supported by any evidence in the record and is reversed ")

""Even if there were no disputed issue of material fact, thi
summary judgment would not award an attorneys fee withou
a stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted affidavit, or evi
dence given as to the value thereof" Freed Finance Compan
v Stoker Motor Company, 537 P2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975)
Therefore, even if the opposing party does not dispute the fe<
award, practitioners should take care to submit either a stipu
lation, an affidavit, or other evidence regarding the value of thi
requested attorney fees In the event evidence is undisputed,.
party may be entitled to recover attorney fees by summary dis
position See infra note 88 and accompanying text
34
Salmon, supra note 4 at 893, see also Cottonwood Mall Co
v Sine, 830 P2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992)

3->Aside from the obvious advantages of submitting a fe<
request in writing, rather than by oral testimony, a written fe<
request reduces the chance that counsel requesting attorney
fees will be subject to cross examination However, a paitf
may be entitled to cross examine regardless of the metho<
chosen to submit the evidence As the Utah Supreme Court ha
noted, "[i]f necessary
a party should have an opportunity
to contest the accuracy of the documents by either counter
affidavit or cross-examination of the opposing attorney befon
the court " Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 at 269
^Associated Indus Developments v Jewkes, 701 P2d 486
489 (Utah 1985) (finding "trial court abrogated its responsi
bility to undertake a full inquiry" of evidence in support o
attorney fees by refusing to receive testimony by attorney fo
party requesting fee), Stubbs v Hemmert, 567 P2d 168, 17(
(Utah 1977) (finding trial court's award of attorney fees wa
reasonable based, in part, upon testimony of plaintiff's attor
ney), see also Associated Indus Developments, 701 P2d a
488 ("Logically, the attorney claiming the fee ought to be
valuable and relevant source of information concerning thi
composition of that fee "), but see Paul Mueller Co v Cachi
Valle\ Dairy Assoc 657 P2d 1279,1287-88 (Utah 1982) (not
ing that where "detailed billing records" were submitted b1
stipulation, trial court abused its discretion in relying onh
upon statement of counsel at post-trial hearing)
^'A practitioner should not, however, object on the ground
that counsel cannot act as both a witness and an attorney in
case First, such an argument is incorrect See Utah Rule o
Professional Conduct 3 7(a)(2) (allowing attorney to testif
where [t]he testimony relates to the nature and value of lega
services rendered in the case ) see also Associated Indus
Developments supra note 36 at 489 n 1 (allowing attorney t<
testify regarding attorney fees under previous version of Rule
of Professional Conduct) Second if the trial court erroneous
ly sustains the objection the appellate court may find thj
'counsel cannot successfully object at trial to [opposing
counsel s testimony about his fee and then complain on appea
that plaintiff has failed to prove the reasonableness of the tee
Id at 489 (declining to reverse award of attorney fees fo
insufficient evidence where attorney for party requesting fee
was not allowed to testify because opposing counsel objecte<
on grounds that "attorneys are not permitted to testify in case
in which they represent" a party)
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^Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520.523-24 (Utah 1978);
see also Regional, supra, note 32 at 1215 ("[A] trial court is
lot compelled to accept the self-serving testimony of a party
equesting attorney fees even if there is no opposing testimony."'); Paul Mueller Co.. supra note 36 at 1287-88 (noting "it is
lot good practice to make an award [of an attorney fee] predcated only upon [the] opinion [of a party's artome\].") (quotng 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §812e(2). at 1554.): but see infra note
}8 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of summary
udgment motion for attorney fees where no disputed issue of
naterial fact).
*9Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-505.

%
X]
In LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189 (Utah App.
1991). the Utah Court of Appeals noted the hourly rate for
;ach attorney is not required, and that 4l[s]o long as the legal
5asis of the award, the nature of the work performed by the
ittorneys, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim,
md some affirmation that the fees charged are reasonable in
light of comparable legal services are included in the affidavit
submitted by the party requesting the fees, there is no failure
o comply with Rule 4-505(1). Id. at 198. Inconsistent statements have also been made in this area. Although perhaps dislinguishable because the court was not discussing Rule 4-505,
[he Utah Supreme Court has apparently contradicted the statement in LMV Leasing, by noting that "[sjufficient evidence
should include the hours spent on the case, the hourly rate
charged for those hours, and the usual and customary rates for
such work." Salmon, supra note 4 at 893 (emphasis added).
42Id.

" Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 at 269.
^Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 at 268-69
**See infra notes 34 through 38 and accompanying text.
*6See subsection c.

4

'See subsection b.

^See infra note 88 and accompanying text. "Specifically, where
attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing party on summary judgment, the undisputed, material facts must establish, as a matter
of law. that (1) the parry is entitled to the award and (2) the
amount awarded is reasonable." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770
P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1989).
^See infra notes 32 through 33 and accompanying text, and
subsection c in general.
allocation issue is treated as separate rule by the courts,
independent of the reasonableness analysis discussed in section
d. See, infra notes 48 through 51; but see Mountain States
Broadcasting v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 649 n.10 (Utah App. 1989)
(noting that "a reasonable fee" will only compensate party for
those fees expended upon issues where the party prevailed.).

^Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34 at 269-70.
55

Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n supra note 51 at 66.
(finding no abuse of discretion in trial courts refusal to award
any attorney fees where party requesting fees failed to distinguish between time "spent prosecuting its complaint and the
portion spent in defending the counterclaim"); Selvage v. J.J.
Johnson & Assoc, 910P.2d 1252, 1266 n.16 (Utah App. 1996)
(noting that "it may be proper to deny a request for attorney
fees if the requesting party fails to allocate in accord with the
directive of Cottonwood MalF).
- 6 "[S]uch a decision is within the trial court's discretion,
rather than being a strict legal requirement." Selvage, supra
note 55 at 1266 n.15 (citing Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d
1384, 1394 (Utah App. 1994)). *

* * Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62,
66(1981).
^See, e.g., Paul Mueller Co., supra note 36 at 1288 (allowing
only those fees incurred in defense of the main causes of action,
but not those incurred in pursuit of counterclaim); Stubbs, supra
note 36 at 170 & n. 11 (refusing to award any attorney fees
incurred in trial where contractual liability for fees was limited
to collection of debt and these claims were settled before trial);
Sears, supra note 17 at 1110 (upholding trial court's reduction in
fees where trial court found "'a goodly portion of the time'
would have been directed to activities other than simply defending against... the claim."); Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856,
858 (Utah 1984) ("[A] party is entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights within
the terms of the agreement").
^See, e.g. Graco Fishing v. Jronwood Exploration, 766 P.2d
1074,1079-80 (Utah 1988) (remanding for allocation of attorney
fees between those incurred in pursuit of successful claims under
one statute, and unsuccessful claims pursued under other
statute).
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The Recovery of Attorney Fees in Utah:
A Procedural Primer for Practitioners - Part II
By James E. Magleby
Editor's note: Part I was published in the
December 1996 issue of the Bar Journal.
d. Reasonableness of Fees
Once the initial evidentiary burdens are
met,57 the trial court must determine what
constitutes a "reasonable" attorney fee, the
issue upon which practitioners will probably find the majority of their energy
focused once an award of fees is made.58
In determining a reasonable attorney
fee, Utah trial courts have considered a
number of factors, although it is important
to note that "[t]he question of what is a
reasonable attorneyf] fee in a contested
matter is not necessarily controlled by any
set formula."59 Among others,60 Utah courts
have considered the following factors:61
1. The difficulty of the litigation.
2. The efficiency of the attorneys in
presenting the case.
3. The fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar services.
4. The amount involved in the case.
5. The result attained.
6. The expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved.62
7. The amount in controversy.
8. The extent of services rendered.
9. *'[0]ther factors which the trial
court is in an advantaged position
to judge."63
10. The relationship of the fee to the
amount recovered.
11. The novelty and difficulty of the
issues involved.
12. The overall result achieved.
13. The necessity of initiating the
lawsuit.M
In addition, although never explicitly listed
as a factor, the courts have considered
whether the opposing party pursued an
'inconsistent and unmeritorious" litigation
strategy,65 or acted to "complicate[] and make
more difficult" the discovery process.66
However, in Dixie State Bank v.
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Bracken*1 the Utah Supreme Court recognized the confusion created by Utah case

law,68 and "in order to foster consistent and
equitable fee awards . .. constructed 'practical guidelines' for analyzing the
reasonableness of attorney fees, by consolidating the approaches advocated in
then-existing case law into a simple fourstep procedure."69 The court announced the
general rule that although many "factors
may be explicitly considered in determining a reasonable fee, as a practical
matter the trial court should find answers
to four questions:"70
1. What legal work was actually
performed?
2. How much of the work performed
was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent
with the rates customarily charged
in the locality for similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which
require consideration of additional
factors, including those listed in the
Code of Professional Responsibility?71
Accordingly, at the minimum, practitioners
who seek an award of attorney fees should
argue these four factors before the trial
court to withstand appeal. If additional factors are to be argued, practitioners should
alert the court that they are properly considered under the fourth step of Dixie.12
The Dixie court's attempt to clarify the
appropriate procedure for determining reasonable attorney fees has not, however,
eliminated the confusion over the issue.
Despite the Dixie court's attempt to create
a uniform format for considering the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees,
Utah courts have not demanded rigorous
adherence to the four factors,7^ even as
recently as 1996.4 At first glance, this may
suggest that so long as the trial court's
award is based upon consideration of some
mix of factors, and is supported by the evidence, it will withstand review. This is not,
however, always the case."5
Vol. 10 No. I

The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed
this apparent deviation, noting that Cabrera
"is often cited for the same principles as
Dixie."16 Although it is not immediately
obvious from a comparison of the cases,77
the Quinn court concluded that both Cabrera
and Dixie "ultimately recommend consideration of the same factors."78 However, the
Quinn court went on to apply Dixie, "both
because it was decided after Cabrera, and
because we believe its four step approach
is simpler to apply, and will therefore lead
to more consistently correct results."79
The confusion is enhanced by occasional reliance by Utah courts upon Rule
4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration to affirm the reasonableness of
attorney fees. Although Rule 4-505 appears
designed to facilitate the submission of
evidence regarding attorney fees, and does
not specifically80 call for practitioners to
submit evidence on all four factors enunciated in Dixie** practitioners who comply
with the rule can argue that under Utah
law, they have offered sufficient evidence
of reasonableness to withstand appeal.82
In addition, practitioners should take
care that the trial court does not improperly

modify a request for attorney fees based
upon considerations disfavored by Utah
appellate courts. First, it should be noted
that attorney fees in excess of a damages
award are not per se unreasonable.83 Furthermore, "what an attorney bills or the number
of hours spent on a case is not determinative."84 Finally, "although the amount in
controversy can be a factor in determining a
reasonable fee, care should be used in
putting much reliance on this factor."85
Accordingly, if the trial court appears
inclined to base an award of attorney fees on
one or more of these factors, a practitioner
should encourage the trial court to do so as
part of its consideration of the four factors
enumerated in Dixie.
Because of the inconsistent manner in
which the reasonableness analysis is conducted in Utah case law, practitioners face
the dilemma of how to proceed in presenting
reasonableness arguments. The best possible
approach appears to be that taken in Quinn,
which suggests that practitioners should
urge trial courts to explicitly consider, at the
minimum, the first three factors enunciated
in Dixie. The trial court should then undertake evaluate the fourth Dixie factor, and

determine if other evidence would be helpful. If the answer is affirmative, then any of
the additional factors may be considered.86
e. Findings
Once an award of attorney fees has been
made, the trial court must make written
findings of fact explaining the grounds for
the award, and why the amount awarded
constitutes a reasonable fee. The only
established exception87 to this rule under
Utah law is where all the relevant facts are
undisputed, as in a summary judgment
motion.88 However, even in this context,
practitioners should be wary, as it takes little to create a disputed issue of fact.89
However, trial courts often fail to make
findings in support of an award of attorney
fees,90 or make findings which fails to consider the appropriate factors,91 requiring the
case to be remanded after appeal. Practitioners who prevail at trial should therefore
take care that the trial court makes findings
articulating the grounds for an award of
attorney fees in a manner which will withstand appellate review.
Findings are required in almost every
situation where attorney fees have been
contested. Utah appellate courts "have con-
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sistently encouraged trial courts to make
findings to explain the factors which they
considered relevant in arriving at an attorney
fee award. Findings are particularly important when the evidence on attorney fees is
in dispute .. . ."92 Detailed findings are also
particularly important in complex cases.93
Trial courts have also shown a tendency to
reduce attorney fee awards sua sponte, or
in the face of uncontested evidentiary submissions.94 In this event, the necessity of
detailed findings is even more imperative.
Where the evidence supporting the
reasonableness of requested attorney
fees is both adequate and entirely
undisputed, as it was here, the court
abuses its discretion in awarding less
than the amount requested unless the
reduction is warranted by one or
more of the factors described in
[Dixie State Bank]. . . . To permit
meaningful review on appeal, it is
necessary that the trial court, on the
record, identify such factors and otherwise explain the basis for its sua
sponte reduction.95
Accordingly, in order for almost any award
of attorney fees to survive appeal, the trial
court must enter findings in support of the
award. Practitioners, therefore, should
encourage the trial court to make findings
regarding the award. Although it may be
counter-intuitive, this is particularly true in
cases where a party does not oppose a fee
request, but has the fee reduced by the trial
court in their favor. Utah appellate courts
are especially demanding about findings in
this situation.
f. Sufficient Findings
Although it is clear that trial courts must
make findings in support of a fee award,
the amount of detail required is not as
obvious. The exact amount of detail
required to survive appellate review is difficult to determine from a review of Utah
case law, as each decision seems to involve
different reasoning, and some have reached
conflicting results. For example, one Utah
Supreme Court Justice has upheld a reduction in attorney fees based only upon an
oral ruling from the bench that the fees
were "excessive."46 However, the remainder
of the court was not in agreement,47 and this
position was inconsistent with that taken
by the Court of Appeals two years earlier.98
Despite the confusion created by such
comparisons, the courts have offered some
general guidance. It appears, at least in the

context of a sua sponte reduction of fees, that
merely listing some of the factors involved
in the determination of "reasonableness,"
without more, is not adequate. For example,
in Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs.,99 the
trial court's entire findings merely stated that
the fee award was based upon:
"'the amount in dispute, the complexity of the issues presented, the hourly
rates charged by the plaintiffs' attorneys and the total evidence presented
at trial.'"100
Although the trial court evaluated some of
the factors which could be considered under
the fourth Dixie factor,101 and made written
findings of fact, the Utah Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court to enter
more detailed findings, noting that "[s]uch
conclusory statements do not satisfy the
requirement that awards of attorney fees
must be supported by adequate findings of
fact."102 The court also noted that "[v]ague
statements which require speculation as to
the actual reasons behind the ruling are not
enough to meet this burden."103 To withstand
review, findings should be as detailed as
findings supporting a damages award.104 Furthermore, "[t]hese findings must be
sufficiently detailed, and include enough
subsidiary facts, to disclose the steps by which
the trial court's decision was reached."105

"Practitioners should urge the
trial court to make as
detailed findings as possible."

Although Utah case law does little to
clarify the exact amount of detail necessary
to sustain an award of attorney fees on
appeal, it does indicate that practitioners
should urge the trial court to make as
detailed findings as possible.106 In order to
create as thorough a record as possible, practitioners should urge the trial court to make
written findings which track the steps in the
decision to award attorney fees. The trial
court should therefore make a written
record107 which does the following: (1) identify the legal basis for the decision to award
attorney fees, whether it be by statute, contract, or equity; (2) identify or acknowledge
the evidence submitted by the party or parties requesting fees; (3) identify any

evidence offered in opposition to the fee
request; (4) identify any allocation issues,
and the role they played in the fee award:
(5) identify the factors it considered in
determining what constitutes a "reasonable" attorney fee;108 and (6) explain how
the factors affected the calculation of the
amount of the award.
g. Scope of Attorney Fees Request
Utah case law has also partially defined
what may be included in an award of attorney fees. The Utah Supreme Court has
allowed recovery of fees incurred by paralegals in preparing the case.109 It has
similarly upheld a trial court's inclusion of
paralegal fees in an award of attorney fees.110
Practitioners should also investigate
whether they are entitled to prejudgment
interest on attorney fees.111
Finally, for those practitioners who are
representing themselves, it should be noted
that Utah follows "the general rule that pro
se litigants should not recover attorney fees
for successful litigation.""2 This rule applies
even if the pro se litigant is a licensed
attorney,113 although one member of the
Utah Supreme Court argued in favor of "the
position . . . that non-attorney pro se litigants
may be entitled to an award of attorney
fees in appropriate circumstances."114
m. CONCLUSION
The ability to sustain a recovery of
attorney fees is made difficult by the confusing nature of Utah case law on the
subject. Because the confusion is shared by
trial courts and practitioners, a practitioner
who wishes to sustain an award of attorney
fees on appeal must first meet the initial
burdens of pleading and evidentiary production. Next, the practitioner should
encourage the trial court to follow the procedural steps outlined by Utah appellate
courts, in particular the consideration of
the appropriate factors in making the fee
award. Finally, practitioners should urge
trial courts to place their reasoning on the
record, so that the award will withstand
appellate review.
" i t should be reiterated that it the e\idence in support ot an
award of attorne) tees is insufficient the tnal court s finding
that an attorney tee award was "reasonable * will not withstand
appeal "When the eudence presented is insufficient, the
court s evaluation ot [the reasonableness ot] those tees will
also be insufficient Cottonwood Mull supra note 34 at 269
-)°" Perhaps the most frequently litigated ii>sue involving attorney[] fees in Utah is that ot determining what constitutes a
'reasonable fee,M Sager, supra note 3 at 563
59
Wallace \ Build. Inc . 402 P2d 699, 701 (Utah 1965)). see
also Dixie, supra note 6 at 989 ("[W]hat constitutes a reasonable fee is not necessarily controlled by any set formula") (cit-
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g Wallace)

fees on Husband's noncompliance with its intenm orders")

enumerated in Cabrera, supra note 12 at 625)

^The factors considered by trial courts have varied over time
3r example, tnal courts once considered "whether the accepnce of employment
will preclude the lawyer's appearing
>r others in cases likely to arise out of the transactions," "will
volve the loss of other employment," "the contingency or the
"rtainty of the compensation," and "the character of the
nployment, whether casual or for an established and constant
lent" Thatcher v Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 568, 207
2d 178, 183-84 (1949), see also FMA Fin Corp v Build,
ic , 404 P2d 670, 673 (Utah 1965) (noting, with regard to the
llue of legal services, "that the judge may fix it on the basis
his own knowledge and experience, and/or in connection
ith reference to a Bar approved schedule') These factors
lve not been considered in recent decisions, and so are orrutd from the list

"'Supra note 6

15

68

The Utah Supreme Court felt that Dixie, "which involves only
the issue of attorney fees, provides us with a unique opportunity
to clanfy our standards for evaluating attorney fees awards
against an abuse of-discretion standard

69

In re Quinn, 830 P2d 282, 235 (Utah App 1992)

^Dixie State Bank, supra note 6 at 992
' * Dixie State Bank, supra note 6 at 992 This last consideration
is a catch-all which may include some, or all, of the other factors
considered in awarding attorney fees Although appropnate
because of the many possible issues which may anse in evaluating the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees, because of
the broad nature of the fourth step, the Utah Supreme Court's
attempt to "clanfy" the "standards for evaluating attorney fee
awards" may be less effective than hoped

'The reader's conclusion that the list may repeat itself is corct The listed factors are taken from cases cited in the Dixie
vision, and are listed as they appear in the cases cited, with
ire taken to maintain nearly identical language with that in
e decisions The result gives a glimpse of the similarity of
e factors considered by the courts, but also reveals the hapizard and sometimes confusing manner in which evaluation
r
the reasonableness of attorney fees has been conducted

72

-Factors 1 through 6 were discussed in Dixie, supra note 6 at
19 (citing Cabrera, supra note 12 at 625) These factors were
*nved from the Code of Professional Responsibility Cabrera
624 However, consideration of these factors is not mandary, as the court noted only that "the tnal court may take into
count the provisions" of the Code of Professional
esponsibility in setting reasonable attorney fees Id
'Factors 7 through 9 were discussed in Dixie, supra note 6 at
19 (citing Wallace v Build, Inc, 16 Utah 2d 410, 402 P2d
)9, 701 (1965))
^Factors 10 through 13 were discussed in Dixie, supra note 6 at
19 (citing Trayner v Cushing, 688 P2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984))
)

Dixie, supra note 6 at 991 In this regard, the court noted
at the losing party's litigation strategy "converted the action
om a routine collection action
into a brouhaha of much
rger proportions" which "increased [the attorney fees] sever-fold over what they should have been
" Id
'Morgan v Morgan, 854 P2d 559, 570 (Utah App 1993), see
so Finlayson v Finlayson, 874 P2d 843, (Utah App 1994)
oting that tnal "court correctly based its award of attorney

The Utah Court of Appeals descnbes the process as follows
"After consideration of the first three cntena, a tnal court can
establish a preliminary fee by multiplying the number of necessary hours of legal work performed by the appropnate hourly
rate " Quinn, supra note 69 at 285 The court then noted that
"after the preliminary fee is established, Dixie's fourth step asks
that courts adjust the amount of that fee, when necessary, to
reflect the court's consideration of vanous cntena set forth in
Utah Code of Professional Re »ponsibihty DR 2-106" Id The
author believes this procedure I > incorrect First, multiplying the
necessary hours by the hourly rate completely ignores the first
factor, consideration of the legal work actually performed
Second, the author does not read Dixie to require consideration
of only the cntena set forth in the Code of Professional
Responsibility See Dixie, mpra note 6 at 990 (noting that court
should consider whether there are "circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the
Code of Professional Responsibility") (emphasis added)
73
See, e g Baldwin v Burton, 850 P2d 1188, 1200 (Utah 1993)
(upholding tnal court's award of attorney fees based upon mix of
factors), Equitable Life & Cos Ins Co v Ross, 849 P2d 1187,
1194 (Utah App 1993) (same), Cottonwood Mall, supra note 34
at 269 (considenng only the factors enumerated in Cabrera,
supra note 12 at 625), see also infra note 72 (discussing failure
of Utah Court of Appeals to consider fact that tnal court did not
consider any of the first three factors enunciated in Dixie)

'^See Salmon, supra note 4 at 893 (considenng only the factors

See Brown v Richards, 840 P 2d 143, 155 (Utah App 1992)
(tnal court abused its discretion where "none [of the factors
considered] answer[ed] the basic questions posed in Dixie
State Bank"), Govert Copier Painting v Van Leeuwen, 801
P2d 163, 174 (Utah App 1990) (remanding case where,
although tnal court "explained its reason for reducing the
attorney fee award, [it] did not utilize the factors established
by appellate courts as relevant to a reduction of fees"),
American Vending Services, Inc v Morse, 881 P 2d 917, 926
(Utah App 1994) ("[T]he tnal court's cursory statement that
the requested attorney fees were 'excessive,' failed to show
that it had undergone an analysis similar to that contemplated
in Dixie State Bank "), Hoth at 220, Rappleve v Rappleye, 855
P2d 260, (Utah App 1993) (remanding case where findings,
"failed to demonstrate that the
award was arnved at after
proper consideration of the relevant factors for determining the
reasonableness of attorney fee awards"), Mountain States
Broadcasting, supra note 50 at 649 n 10 (remanding case for
determination of "reasonableness" under Dixie State Bank factors where tnal court had "simply awarded each [party] the
total amount of its accumulated billing statements "), Sorensen
v Sorensen, 769 P2d 820, 832 (Utah App 1989) (reversing
award of attorney fees where evidence offered "reflect[ed]
only the time spent and the rates charged")
16

Quinn, supra note 69 at 285 n 3

''Cabrera appears to involve the consideration of factors not
contained in Dixie Specifically, Cabrera calls for evaluation
of "the difficulty of the litigation," "the amount involved in the
case and the result attained," and "the expertise and expenence
of the attorneys involved" Cabrera, supra note 12 at 625 A
review of the first three factors in Dixie does not yield the
obvious conclusion that these factors should be considered

rule makes the general statement that the affidavit submitted in support of a request for attorney fees should "affirm
the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services "
See supra note 40 While the use of the term "reasonable"
could be read to call for consideration of all four Dixie factors,
the plain meaning of the phrase more likely comcides with
only the third factor, the rates customanly charged in the locality for similar services See infra note 81
°*Rule 4-505 calls for a descnption of "the nature of the work
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performed by the attorney" probably equivalent to the first
Dixie factor, the legal work actually performed The rule also
mandates that the affidavit "affirm the reasonableness of the
fees for comparable legal services," probably equivalent to the
third Dixie factor, the rates customarily charged in the locality
for similar services The rule does not, however, call for consideration of the amount of work reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, or circumstances which may
require consideration of additional factors, the second and
fourth factors considered in Dixie
%2See Estate of Covington v Josephson, 888 P2d 675, 679
(Utah App 1994) (upholding award of attorney fees where
unrebutted affidavit "comphe[d] with the requirements of Rule
4-505," noting that "the trial court was not required to take further evidence regarding attorney fees "), Equitable Life & Cas
Ins Co v Ross, 849 P2d 1187, 1194-95 (Utah App 1993)
(finding that trial court's award of attorney fees "is amply supported by the evidence and appears to be reasonable, especially in light of the fact that
affidavit with detailed billing
statements attached
strictly complied with Rule 4-505 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration "), LMV Leasing
supra, note 41 at 198-99 (upholding reasonableness of attorney fees where affidavit complied with Rule 4-505)
°3"The total amount of the attorney fees awarded in this case
cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it is greater
than the amount recovered on the contract The amount of the
damages awarded in a case does not place a necessary limit on
the amount of attorney [] fees that can be awarded " Cabrera,
supra note 12 at 625

ed, the rule is no different where the subject of the summary
judgment is a claim for attorney fees " Id (footnote omitted) In
support, the Utah Court of Appeals noted "[o]ther cases recognize that finding are unnecessary to support an award of fees
where the relevant facts are undisputed " Taylor at 169 n 6 (citing Freed Fin Co v Stoker Motor Co, 537 P2d 1039, 1040
(Utah 1975) (attorney fees may be awarded on summary judgment if the record contains a stipulation, an unrebutted affidavit,
or evidence supporting the reasonableness of the award), South
Sanpitch Co v Pack, 765 P2d 1279, 1283 (Utah App 1988)
(uncontroverted testimony concerning amount of reasonable fee
provides adequate basis for fee award)) It is also possible that
findings in support of an award of attorney fees could be
implied, although no Utah court has yet to do so See supra note
87 and accompanying text
° 9 In this regard, a request for attorney fees by summary judgment is no different from any other summary judgment motion
"It takes only one competent sworn statement to dispute the
averments on the other side of the controversy and create an
issue of fact" Redevelopment Agency v Daskalas, supra note 19
at 1126 (reversing trial court's award of attorney fees where
opposing party filed affidavit controverting reasonableness of
fee), see also Provo City Corporation v Cropper, 497 P2d 629,
630 (Utah 1972) ("[UJnless the parties agree otherwise, the
court is obliged to take evidence on the issue of reasonableness
of attorneyf] fees and to make findings thereon") (emphasis
added), FMA Financial, supra (reversing award of attorney
fees where no evidence was presented and no findings made
because the award "was an issue of fact which was denied")
90

°^Dixie State Bank, supra note 6 at 990, see also Mountain
States Broadcasting, supra note 50 at 649 n 10 (remanding
case for determination of "reasonableness" under Dixie State
Bank factors where trial court had "simply awarded each
[party] the total amount of its accumulated billing statements "),
Sorensen v Sorensen, 769 P2d 820, 832 (Utah App 1989)
(reversing award of attorney fees where evidence offered
"reflected] only the time spent and the rates charged")
^Dixie State Bank, supra note 6 at 990 In this regard, the
court made the salient point that "[i]t is a simple fact in a
lawyer's life that it takes about the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of $1,000 as it takes to collect a note
for $100,000" Id
° " Although it should be noted that some factors have apparently fallen into disfavor See supra note 60
° 'One potential way to survive appeal is to argue in favor of
implied findings See, eg, Hall v Hall, 858 P2d 1018, 1025
(Utah App 1993) (findings "can be implied if it is reasonable
to assume that the trial court actually considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding") However,
this tactic has not met with favorable results In Selvage, for
example, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the argument that
a "fair reading" of the record supported the trial court's award,
applying a strict interpretation of the Hall test Taylor, supra
note 55 at 1265
8

** In Taylor supra note 88 at 168, the Utah Court of Appeals
examined whether the rule "that findings of fact are unnecessary in connection with summary judgment decisions," Id at
168, applied to summary judgment regarding an award of
attorney fees The court found that "[a]lthough it may be
unusual for the facts concerning attorney fees to be undisput-

See, e g, Rappleye v Rappleye, 855 P2d 260, 266 (Utah App
1993) (remanding case to dial court where "trial court articulated no reasonable basis for its ultimate award"), Saunders v
Sharp, 818 P 2d 574, 580 (Utah App 1991) (remanding case to
trial court "for an adequate explanation of the amount of fees
awarded" where trial court "gave no explanation to support"
award), In re Estate of Quinn, 784 P2d 1238, 1249 (Utah App
1989) ("The absence in the record before us of findings and conclusions on me issue of attorney fees compels remand to the trial
court to correct that deficiency in the record), cert denied, 795
P2d 1138 (Utah 1990)
91
See supra note 84 and cases therein discussing failure of trial
courts to properly consider the Dixie factors

^Regional, supra note 32 at 1215.
* J See Brown, supra note 75 at 156 (finding that trial court's
findings where "simply too sparse" where "award of attorney
fees is a complex matter due to the adjudication of multiple
claims arising under several contracts with each party winning
some and losing some")
9
^See, eg Selvage, supra note 55 at 1265 (trial court reduced
fees where "the reasonableness of the fee and the supporting
affidavit where uncontroverted by the opposing party"),
Regional, supra note 32 at 1215
95

Martindale v Adams, 111 P2d 514, 517-18 (Utah App 1989)
(emphasis added, see also Selvage, supra note 55 at 1265 (noting that "[t]he need for sufficiently detailed findings is especially great where, as here, the reasonableness of the fee and the supporting affidavit where uncontroverted by the opposing party")
(quoting Martindale), Regional Sales Agency Inc, supra note
32 1215 ("Findings are particularly important when
the trial
court has reduced the attorney fees from those requested and
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Centerville, Utah 84014
(801)298-8803

supported by undisputed evidence ") In fact, it may be a trial
court's duty to reduce an uncontroverted request for attorney
fees See Hoth v White, 799 P 2d 213, 220 (Utah App 1990)
("A court need not award the entire amount requested, but [it]
must evaluate the requested fees to determine if a lesser
amount is reasonable under the circumstances") (emphasis
added) However, although the Hoth court cited Regional,
supra note 32 at 1215, in support of this proposition, it is not
clear that Regional stands for a mandatory evaluation of the
fees Regional at 1215 ("[E]ven if there is no opposing testimony
[a] trial court can evaluate the fees requested and
determine a lesser amount is reasonable under the circumstances") (emphasis added) It is also unclear if a court must
engage in such considerations if there is no dispute regarding
the reasonableness of the requested fees See infra note 88,
discussing whether a trial court must make findings in context
of summary judgment motion
™Salmon, supra note 4 at 901 ("trial court's oral ruling from
the bench that [the] bills were 'excessive' is minimally sufficient to support the reduction here ") (Zimmerman, C J , concurring) (emphasis added), id at 899 (upholding award of
attorney fees, noting the trial court "need only make findings
sufficient to support the ultimate award ") (Russon, J , dissenting)
^Id at 894 (declining to award attorney fees where evidence
was insufficient and "trial court made no findings to support
its reduction, except for the 'finding that most cases have a
cap ") (Durham, J , lead opinion)
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American Vending Services, Inc v Morse, 881 P 2d 917,
926 (Utah App 1994) ("[T]he tnal court's cursory statement
that the requested attorney fees were 'excessive,' failed to
show that it had undergone an analysis similar to that contemplated in Dixie State Bank ")
99

Supra note 55 at 1252

*00/d at 1265 (quoting tnal court's findings of fact)
^Interestingly, none of the first three factors in Dixie were
discussed Id The Utah Court of Appeals did not comment on
the propriety of the tnal court's approach, presumably because
the findings were so inadequate as to allow proper review Id
at n 12 As an example, the Selvage court referred to
Willey v Willey, 866 P2d 547 (Utah App 1993) In Willey, the
tnal court reduced Mrs Willey's attorney fees, noting only
that the amount of fees was a "very unfortunate use of funds "
Id at 556 The court noted that "[w]hile this statement may
indicate the tnal court believed both parties' fees were unreasonable, it does not constitute a finding addressing the reasonableness of Mrs Willey's attorney fees
" Id
^^Brown, supra note 75 at 156 ("When a party is contractually entitled to attorney fees, the tnal court's findings regarding those fees should be just as complete as its findings regarding other types of contractual damages")
105

Quinn, supra note 69 at 286

10o£ v e n ,f a practitioner does not contest the evidentiary sub
missions of the party requesting attorney fees encouraging the
tnal court to make findings may be worthwhile in the event the
tnal court reduces fees sua sponte Without such findings a
sua sponte reduction in fees is certain grounds for an appeal
which will involve additional resources and will almost cer
tainly give an opposing party opportunity to revisit the issue
with the tnal court, perhaps obtaining a more favorable result
*®' Although the courts have not required stnct adherence to a
specific format for findings in support of an award of attorney
fees "[ajs a matter of form it would [be] preferable for the
tnal court to have entered separate findings of fact and con
elusions of law in addition to the order and judgment for attor
ney[] fees Cabrera supra note 12 at 625
' "°As noted supra notes 67 through 72 and accompanying
text, at minimum this should include some discussion ot each
of the four factors identified in Dixie If additional factors are
considered the tnal court should also be encouraged to make
findings explaining why the additional considerations are rel
evant
109

Baldwin \ Burton 850 P2d 1188 (Utah 1993)
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Id at 1200
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RONALD DRAUGHON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, v. CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY,
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT.
No. 880240-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 6, 1989.
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Appeal from the Fourth District Court, Davis County, Douglas L.
Cornaby, J.
Craig G. Adamson, Eric P. Lee, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Lewis B. Quigley, Linda L.W. Roth, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
Before BENCH, GARFF and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Plaintiff Ronald Draughon appeals from an order denying his
motion for summary judgment and granting defendant CUNA Mutual
Insurance Society's cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial
court ruled that the credit life insurance policy CUNA issued to
Draughon and his wife unambiguously excluded coverage for :the
loss Draughon claimed. We reverse and remand with instructions to
enter judgment for Draughon.
FACTS
In October of 1985, Draughon and his wife borrowed money from
America First Credit Union to purchase an automobile. As part of
this transaction, the Draughons bought a credit life insurance
policy from CUNA. In relevant part, with our emphasis, the policy
required CUNA to pay the remaining balance on the Draughons'
automobile loan upon the death of either of them, but excluded
coverage "if any material
contributing
cause of [death] was
from sickness or injury which first became manifest prior to the
time insurance coverage was otherwise effective. . . . "
On the effective date of coverage, Mrs. Draughon suffered from
a kidney disease which was treated by hemodialysis three times
per week. Her physician testified at his deposition that with
continuing treatments she was expected to live an otherwise
normal life for another twenty to thirty years. Nonetheless, in
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November of 1985 Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a kidney
transplant operation. The operation itself was successful, but
Mrs. Draughon developed acute pancreatitis as a consequence of an
immunosuppressive steroid drug administered to help prevent
rejection of the transplanted kidney.[fn1] The pancreatitis led
to an internal abdominal infection
Page 1107
and, in turn, Mrs. Draughon1s
fatal cardiac arrest on February 1, 1986.
Shortly after his wife's death, Draughon filed a claim under
the policy and demanded that CUNA pay off the America First loan.
CUNA denied Draughon's claim, asserting that his wife's
pre-existing kidney disease was a "material contributing cause"
of her death for which coverage was excluded. Draughon then filed
this action. Both he and CUNA filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, and CUNA's motion was granted. The trial court held
that Mrs. Draughon's pre-existing kidney disease was a "material
contributing cause" of her death for which coverage was
unambiguously excluded as a matter of law. The court reasoned
that "[i]f not for her kidney disease, Mrs. Draughon would not
have elected to undergo a kidney transplant. If she had not had
the kidney transplant, she would not have been given steroid
drugs which caused acute pancreatitis, which ultimately caused
her death."
On appeal, Draughon argues that the trial court erred by
interpreting the phrase "material contributing cause" according
to Oregon workers' compensation law. [fn2] Draughon contends that
he, not CUNA, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law given
the undisputed evidence before the trial court.
OREGON CASES
No reported Utah decision has interpreted the phrase "material
contributing cause" in the context of an insurance policy
exclusion. Nor could we, the parties, or the trial court locate
any such compelling cases from other jurisdictions. Noting this
lack of authority, the trial court sought to construe the phrase
consistent with Oregon decisions involving claims under Oregon's
workers' compensation statutory scheme. See Manous v.
Argonaut
Ins.,
790r.App.645, 719 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1986). See
also
Peterson
v. Eugene F. Burrill
Lumber, 294 Or. 537,
660 P.2d 1058, 1058 (1983); Grable v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 291 Or. 387,
631P.2d768, 771-76 (1981); Standley
v. State Accident
Ins.
Fund,
8Qr.App.429, 495P.2d283, 285 (1972).
The trial court's reliance on these cases is misplaced for two
reasons. First, we fail to see the substantive relevance of
Oregon's workers' compensation law to the interpretation of
insurance contracts in Utah, even if the same phrase is involved
in both instances. Second, these Oregon cases are not helpful
here as they do not purport to define
the phrase "material
contributing cause," which is the task in this case. Rather, the
Oregon courts utilize the phrase to further explain when an
injury is deemed "arising out of" the injured person's employment
for purposes of adjudicating entitlement to workers' compensation
benefits. See, e.g.,
Olson v. State
Indus.
Accident
Comm'n,
222 Or. 407, 352 P.2d 1096, 1100 (1960). As the trial court here
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correctly recognized, the Oregon courts1 only attempt to define
the phrase "material contributing cause" is to say that such an
event "need not be the sole or principal cause. . . . " Manous,
719 P.2d at 1320.
We conclude the Oregon cases are irrelevant to the present
matter, and shed no light on the meaning of the phrase "material
contributing cause" as used in the CUNA policy.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CUNA
To sustain the judgment in favor of CUNA, we must conclude, as
a matter of law, that Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was a
"material contributing cause" of her
Page 1108
death. From all that
appears, the phrase "material contributing cause" is not defined
in the policy, [fn3] and it must be interpreted by us. CUNA bears
the burden to prove Draughon's claim falls within the policy
exclusion. See, e.g., LDS Hosp. v. Capitol
Life Ins. Co., 94
Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 18, 765 P.2d 857 (1988); Whitlock
v. Old Am.
Ins.
Co., 21 Utah_2d 131, 442_P,_2d 26, 27 (1968).
Rules of Interpretation
The interpretation of an integrated, unambiguous[fn4] contract
is a question of law, and, accordingly, we give no particular
deference to the trial court's interpretation. See, e.g.,
Kimball
v. Campbell,
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985);
Seashores
Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). We
construe the policy as we perceive it would be understood by the
average, reasonable purchaser of insurance. See, e.g., LDS
Hosp.,
94 Utah Adv.Rep. at 17, 765 P.2d 857 (quoting Phil
Schroeder,
Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 99 Wn.2d 65,
659P.2d509, 511 (1983)); Clark v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 204 Kan. 487,
464 P.2d 253, 257 (1970) ("If a policy of insurance is clear and
unambiguous, the words are to be taken and understood in their
plain, ordinary and popular sense, as an average or reasonable
person with ordinary understanding would construe them, when used
to express the purpose for which they were employed in the
policy."); Totten
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 298 Or. 765,
696 P.2d 1082, 1086 (1985) ("We interpret the terms of an insurance
policy according to what we perceive to be the understanding of
the ordinary purchaser of insurance."). See also G. Couch,
Couch on Insurance 2d §§ 15:17,:18 (1984). More particularly, an
insurer wishing to limit coverage through an exclusion must
employ language clearly identifying the scope of the limitation.
See, e.g., National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Reno's Executive
Air,
Inc.,
100 Nev. 360, 682 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1984). Even if the
policy employs technical terms, we do not construe it "through
the magnifying eye of the technical lawyer," Wheeler
v.
Employer's
Mut. Casualty
Co., 211 Kan. 100, 505P.2d768, 772
(1973), but rather as it would be understood by "one not trained
in law or in the insurance business." National
Union Fire
Ins.,
682 P.2d at 1382. See also American Nat'l
Fire Ins. Co. v.
Esquire
Labs of Arizona,
143 Ariz. 512, 694 P.2d 800, 808
(Ct.App. 1984) ("an insurance policy must be read using the
ordinary language of the average layman rather than by using
technical medical, legal, insurance or statutory terms.").
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"Material Contributing Cause"
With the above rules of interpretation in mind, we note that
the phrase "material contributing cause" as used in the CUNA
policy is significant only as a legal concept of causation. The
phrase is not employed to describe a person, place, or thing
about which average purchasers of insurance can be expected to
have much of an understanding. This compounds the insurer's
burden to prove coverage is clearly excluded. For example, the
meaning of the term "motor vehicle," when used in an insurance
policy, may be somewhat unclear absent express definition.
However, average persons have at least some understanding of the
term's intended meaning because of its familiarity, and we
construe it accordingly. See Clark,
464 P.2d at 257 ("the terms
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'automobile,' 'motor vehicle' and 'vehicle' are of such common
usage that an insured would understand the more limited aspects
of the term 'automobile,' the broader facets of the term 'motor
vehicle' and that the term 'vehicle' may include almost any means
of [transportation].")/ Totten,
696 P.2d at 1087 (the phrase
"any aircraft" is commonly understood to include hang gliders).
Cf. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 751 P.2d248, 252 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988) (dispute as to whether the term "motor vehicles"
includes motorcycles). Unlike "motor vehicle," the technical
concept expressed through the phrase "material contributing
cause" is not easily understood by an average policy purchaser
untrained in the law. CUNA might have employed phrases and terms
which plainly and clearly explain how the concept excludes
coverage. Instead, it chose to employ a technical phrase having
no relevant, prior judicial construction, and without explaining
its significance in plain, understandable language .[fn5]
As we see it, the average purchaser of insurance would
understand the CUNA policy to exclude coverage where death is a
natural, medically connected consequence of a pre-existing
sickness or injury. The sickness or injury need not be the only
cause of death, but there must be a medical link between the
death and the disease. On the other hand, we think the average
purchaser of insurance would not understand the policy to exclude
coverage where a totally different illness caused by
medical
treatment
for a pre-existing disease was the exclusive cause of
death. If such an exclusion was intended, it is CUNA's
responsibility to draft its policy to clearly convey this message
to its insureds. Indeed, other insurers with such an intention
have found a way to say so. See, e.g., Schick v. Nationwide
Ins.
Co., 117 Ohio App. 238, 192 N.E.2d 93, 94 (1962) (coverage
excluded where death occurs "as the result of or by the
contribution of disease . . . or medical or surgical treatment
therefore or infection of any nature"); Perry v.
Hartford
Accident
and Indem. Co., 256 Or. 73, 471 P.2d785, 786 (1970)
(coverage excluded where death "caused by or resulting from . . .
sickness or disease or medical or surgical treatment"). We will
not insert words into a policy under the guise of interpretation
where the insurer could have easily avoided the problem by
drafting its policy more carefully and precisely. Cf.
American
Nat'l
Fire Ins. Co., 694 P.2d at 808 (an exclusion for "hair
transplant" processes cannot be construed to apply to "hair
implant" processes because those terms, as commonly understood,
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refer to two distinctly different things).
Moreover, our interpretation of the policy is entirely
consistent with insightful hypothetical situations offered by the
trial court in support of its ruling, and revisited by CUNA on
appeal. The trial court explained that, in its view, coverage
under the subject policy would be available where an insured
cancer patient is hit by a car and killed while walking to the
hospital to receive medical treatment. On the other hand,
coverage would be excluded where an AIDS patient dies after
contracting pneumonia. We do not take exception to this
dichotomy. However, we find the distinction appropriate mainly
because the AIDS patient's death from pneumonia is a natural,
medical consequence of the underlying disease, whereas the cancer
patient's being struck by an automobile is medically unrelated to
the cancer. This is true even though "but for" the cancer or the
AIDS, the patient in each scenario would not have encountered the
precise event ultimately causing death. In our view, Mrs.
Draughon's being struck with pancreatitis is more like the cancer
patient being struck by a car than an AIDS patient being struck
by pneumonia.
Thus, CUNA is entitled to its summary judgment only if the
undisputed evidence
Page 1110
establishes that Mrs. Draughon's kidney
disease itself contributed naturally and medically to her death.
As explained above, the requisite causal link is not established
simply because "but for" her disease, she would not have had the
transplant. Conversely, if the undisputed evidence establishes as
a matter of law that the medical
treatment
Mrs. Draughon
received caused her death, without contribution by her kidney
disease, Draughon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
A review of the evidence before the trial court requires the
entry of a judgment for Draughon. CUNA has simply failed to meet
its burden to prove Draughon's claim falls within the exclusion.
The only evidence before the trial court, in addition to
noncontradictory deposition testimony, was the affidavit of Dr.
Wayne Border, Mrs. Draughon's last attending physician, and the
affidavit of Dr. Robert Bond, who reviewed Mrs. Draughon's
medical records following her death. Dr. Border asserts in his
affidavit that Mrs. Draughon's death was caused by pancreatitis,
an unusual complication of the kidney transplant but medically
unrelated to her kidney disease. Dr. Bond stated in his affidavit
that "pancreatitis was a complication that in all probability
occurred as a result of the treatment that was done for Sandra
Draughon's primary, underlying renal disease."
Thus, the expert medical testimony in this case is undisputed
and clearly establishes that Mrs. Draughon's underlying kidney
disease did not contribute to her death in any natural or medical
sense.[fn6] It is equally clear that she died exclusively as a
consequence of the medical treatment she had received three
months previously. [fn7]
Accordingly, the judgment in favor of CUNA is reversed and the
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case remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of
Draughon.
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., concur.
[fnl] Her reaction to the drug was described in one doctor's
affidavit as "an unusual complication of kidney transplant
operations and immunosuppresive treatment."
[fn2] Draughon argues that the phrase "material contributing
cause" should be interpreted to mean "proximate cause." This
argument is without merit. The phrase "proximate cause" has a
well-established meaning as a legal concept. If CUNA had this
concept in mind when drafting the exclusion, it would have
employed the precise term "proximate cause" or some other phrase
having a similarly recognizable meaning. It is obvious that by
choosing the phrase "material contributing cause" CUNA intended
to exclude coverage in a broader range of circumstances than
would the phrase "proximate cause." See, e.g., Minyen
v.
American
Home Assurance
Co., 443F.2d788, 790 (10th Cir. 1971);
Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anglinf
306 So.2d 147/ 149
(Fla.Ct.App. 1975).
[fn3] Oddly, the actual policy does not appear in the record
before us. Both parties were content to merely quote the key
provision in their moving papers. Because seeing particular
provisions in their overall context often aids interpretation, it
is always preferable for courts to have access to the entire
policy. See, e.g.,
LDS Hosp. v. Capitol
Life Ins. Co., 94 Utah
Adv.Rep. 16, 17, 765 P.2d 857 (1988).
[fn4] Draughon also argues that the phrase "material contributing
cause" is inherently ambiguous because the term "material"
creates a subjective standard of causation. We disagree. As will
be established, we find the phrase unambiguous because it has a
plain meaning understood by "a person of ordinary intelligence
and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in
accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and
in the light of existing circumstances." Auto Leasing
Co. v.
Central
Mut. Ins. Co., 7Utah2d336, 325 P.2d 264, 266 (1958).
See, e.g.,
LDS Hosp.,
94 Utah Adv.Rep. at 17, 765 P.2d 857
(applying the above standard to an insurance policy exclusion).
[fn5] A limited exception to the doctrine favoring construction
of insurance policies in accordance with an average layperson's
understanding may exist where a technical phrase having a
judicially established meaning is used. See G. Couch, Couch on
Insurance § 15:17 (1984) (a technical phrase may be interpreted
according to prior judicial construction even if the insured is
unaware of that construction).
[fn6] Ordinarily, the cause of death for purposes of entitlement
to insurance coverage is a question for the jury. See,
e.g.,
Whitlock
v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442P.2d26, 27
(1968). However, where, as here, the facts are undisputed,
summary disposition is appropriate. See Nationwide
Mut. Ins.
Co.
v. Anglin,
306So.2d147, 149 (Fla.Ct.App. 1975); Perry
v.
Hartford
Accident
and Indem. Co., 256 Or. 73, 471 P.2d785, 789
(1970).
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[fn7] This is not to say that in every case a distinction between
the causative effects of the disease and the treatment will be
possible. In some situations, a disease and its treatment will be
so inextricably linked as to make it impossible to distinguish
between the two in determining a "material contributing cause" of
death.
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Original Proceeding in this Court
Robert A. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for petitioners.
Jan Graham, Attorney General, Annina M. Mitchell, Assistant
Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for Public Service
Commission.
Gregory B. Monson, John M. Eriksson, Salt Lake City, and
Molly Hastings, Douglas N. Owens, Seattle, WA, for U.S. West.
Michael L. Ginsberg, Phillip C. Pugsley, Kent Walgren,
Assistant Attorneys General, Salt Lake City, for intervenors.
DURHAM, Justice:
We hear this case on petition for review of a final agency
action by the Public Service Commission (the Commission)
determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees to be
awarded to petitioners John J. Flynn and James L. Barker, Jr.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1) . We modify the Commission's
decision as described below.
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1994, we held that the Commission could not increase U.S.
West Communications, Inc.'s (USWC) authorized rate of return on

equity above a reasonable rate of return, that the statute
permitting a public utility to veto a Commission decision
constituted an unconstitutional delegation of power, and that
the incentive rate regulation plan presented by the Commission
was "arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful." Stewart
v. Utah Pub.
Serv.
Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 773, 779, 781 (Utah 1994). The
petitioning ratepayers were represented by attorneys Flynn and
Barker. Given the important public interests vindicated by
petitioners, we awarded them attorney fees, although not
statutorily authorized, under two alternative theories —
private attorney general or common fund. Id. at 783. This case
was the first in which we awarded attorney fees not authorized
by a contract or statute. Id. We remanded two issues to the
Commission for decision: (1) the lawful rate of return on
equity permitted to USWC and (2) the amount of reasonable
attorney fees. Id. at 773, 783.
In September 1995, the parties executed and filed a
stipulation with the Commission requiring USWC to refund its
ratepayers $3,212,852 plus interest, settling all issues on
remand except attorney fees. In December, the Commission issued
an order on refund which differed from the initial stipulation.
In mid-January 1996, petitioners requested a rehearing on the
refund order. The Commission granted this request and heard
petitioners on January 31, 1996. On February 22, 1996, the
Commission issued its "Order on Reconsideration of Order on
Refund," dealing with the rate of return issues.
Prior to its final resolution of the refund issues, on
December 20, 1995, the Commission issued an order of attorney
fees, reducing the reported hours spent on the case by
twenty-five percent, compensating Flynn at $250 an hour and
Barker at $175 an hour, rejecting application of a multiplier
or an award of a percentage of the common fund, allowing
payment of copying, postage, and other expenses, reducing
paralegal compensation from the requested $50 to $25 per hour,
denying compensation for secretarial work, and refusing to
award any attorney fees related to the adjudication of the
attorney fees themselves. The order further stated that
attorney fees not in dispute that are "authorized by this
order" should be paid "forthwith." Because the Commission found
that USWC had to disgorge overcharges to its ratepayers, thus
creating a common fund, the attorney fees awarded will come out
of that fund. See Stewart,
885 P.2d at 783.
In early January, believing that the Commission had
unreasonably reduced their compensation, petitioners requested
a rehearing on the attorney fees order. The Commission
constructively rejected this request by failing to respond
within twenty days. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3) (b) .
Petitioners subsequently petitioned this court for a writ of
review on the attorney fees order, and we granted the writ.
II. JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to review "final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16 (1) . The Commission argues that this court lacks
jurisdiction to review the attorney fees order because it does

not represent a final
agency action. We conclude that the
record established that the order was final and that all
parties viewed it as such until review.
The Commission divided the questions presented by this
court's remand in Stewart,
885 P.2d 759/ into two parts: one
addressing attorney fees, the other addressing the appropriate
rate of return and customer reimbursement. The Commission
issued the attorney fees order first and the refund order
second. The refund order does not change any aspect of the
attorney fees order.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act does not specifically
define "final agency action." However, it does say that an
agency will contemplate reconsideration of an order only "if
the order would otherwise constitute final agency action." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-13. We can thus assume the Commission
considered the attorney fees order to be a final agency action
by virtue of its failure to
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indicate that the action was not final at the time of the
rehearing request. The Commission merely denied the request for
rehearing by nonaction instead of notifying petitioners that
they would have to apply for rehearing at a later date.
Moreover, the reconsideration of the refund order undertaken
thereafter does not address the attorney fees order except to
acknowledge it as final and appealable. The refund order
specifically discusses what will happen if either party appeals
the attorney fees order. [fn1] It never suggests that it supersedes
or somehow subsumes the attorney fees order; it purports to
modify only the earlier order and stipulation regarding the
refund. Thus quite clearly, at the time of appeal, all parties
understood the order on attorney fees to constitute an
appealable final agency action. We see no reason to regard it
differently.
Because of the nature of agency proceedings, final actions
often take place seriatim, disposing completely of discrete
issues in one order while leaving other issues for later
orders. Such orders will be final as to any issue fully decided
by that order and appealable any time from the date of that
order to the last day to appeal the last final agency action in
the case.
For assistance in defining "final agency action" more
explicitly, we look to other state and federal laws which
employ the term. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, with regard
to the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342
(1988):
[T]he relevant considerations in determining
finality are whether the process of administrative
decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial
review will not disrupt the orderly process of
adjudication and whether rights or obligations
have been determined or legal consequences will
flow from the agency action.

Port of Boston Marine Terminal
Ass'n
v.
Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62, 71, 91 S. Ct. 203, 209, 27 L.Ed.2d
203 (1970); see also Franklin
v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788,
797, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 2773-74, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992)
(interpreting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704
(1988)). Similarly, the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act defines final agency action negatively as "the whole or a
part" of any action which is not "preliminary, preparatory,
procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency
action of that agency or another agency." 1981 Model State
Admin. P. Act § 5-102(b)(2).
The attorney fees order in this case meets both of these
definitions. When the Commission failed to grant a rehearing on
the order, it reached the end of its decision-making process on
this issue. Hence judicial review at this point will not
interfere with the Commission's proceedings. Moreover, the
language of the order makes clear that the Commission
determined obligations of the parties with which the parties
must immediately comply. In addition, this order clearly falls
under the Model Act's definition of "final" because it is not
even arguably preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or
intermediate.
This ruling is consistent with prior Utah cases. The Utah
cases on finality found no final order in the following
circumstances: (1) a remand for further proceedings, Sloan
v.
Board of Review,
781 P.2d463, 464 (Utah Ct.App. 1989); (2) an
order converting informal proceedings into formal ones, Merit
Elec.
& Instrumentation
v. Department
of
Commerce,
902 P.2d 151, 153 (Utah Ct.App. 1995); and (3) a denial of a motion to
dismiss, Barney v. Division
of Occupational
&
Professional
Licensing,
828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). These cases
do not involve actions in the nature of a seriatim final order;
they all involve preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or
intermediate decisions. Thus our holding today merely clarifies
the definition of "final agency action" rather than changing
it.
We emphasize, however, that this rule applies only to
administrative
determinations. It does not in any way affect
the rules of
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appealability governing cases from the district court and the
court of appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily, we review attorney fee awards under an abuse of
discretion standard. Salmon v. Davis County,
916 P.2d 890, 897
(Utah 1996) (Russon, J., dissenting) (stating standard of
review in which three justices concur). However, in a case such
as this, where the trier of fact is one of the parties whose
actions we adjudicated prior to remand, we believe that
fairness requires review of the Commission's findings on
attorney fees under an intermediate standard, affording the
Commission some discretion, as in mixed fact and law
determination. See State
v. Pena, 869P.2d932, 938 (Utah 1994)
(stating that "policy reasons" can require court to limit
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discretion afforded lower court).
The dual role of advocate and adjudicator occasionally
creates potential for at least the appearance of conflicts of
interest for administrative agencies. See V-1 oil v.
Department
of Envtl.
Quality,
939 P.2d 1192, 1196-98 (Utah 1997). This
risk seems particularly realistic where an agency is required
to determine compensation due to attorneys1 representing
parties who have defeated the agency's position in an
adversarial proceeding.
Under these circumstances, due process requires a somewhat
heightened standard of review. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7. In
Anderson
v. Industrial
Commission,
696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah
1985), for example, we noted, "Fairness requires not only an
absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the
possibility of unfairness." We reiterated this sentiment in
Bunnell
v. Industrial
Commission,
740 P.2d 1331, 1333-34 (Utah
1987), where we held that an administrative law judge's
behavior suggested partiality warranting a remand.
In Stewart,
this court pointedly criticized the Commission's
actions and ruled in the petitioners' favor. Despite our
complete confidence in the professionalism of the Commission, a
potential for the appearance of bias exists in this situation.
This is particularly true where the Commission must make
subjective determinations about the attorneys' skills, the
quality of the results obtained, and the difficulty of the
questions involved, as required in attorney fee determinations.
The federal government and some states have handled this
problem by giving the court that overturns an agency's ruling
permission to determine attorney fees. E.g.,
5 U.S.C.S. §
504(c)(1) (Law.Co-op. 1989) & 28 U.S.C.S. § 2412(d)(3)
(Law.Co-op. 1990); 5 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 100/10-55(c) (West
1993) .
In Utah, because final agency actions are reviewed directly
by appellate courts, determining attorney fees without a prior
record on the issue would place an unrealistic burden on the
appellate system; appellate courts are not designed to hear
fact questions. Therefore, asking the Commission to hear
evidence and make findings of fact, on the amount of attorney
fees makes sense. However, to prevent the possibility of
unfairness, we will undertake a moderate degree of scrutiny of
the agency's determinations on the appropriateness of the award
amount.
Moreover, as petitioners point out, the relief they acquired
was fashioned by this court in Stewart;
thus, we have an
advantage in assessing its value. We generally give deference
on attorney fee determinations to the " 'judge who actually
presided over the proceeding and has first-hand familiarity
with the litigation,' " Salmon,
916 P.2d at 892-93 (quoting
Utah Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah
Ct.App. 1991)), and in these circumstances, giving weight to
this court's similar familiarity is appropriate. Reviewing the
Commission's determination under an intermediate standard in
this case, however, follows prior policy in addition to
preserving both the appearance of fairness and fairness itself.

IV. ATTORNEY FEES AWARD
Courts award attorney fees for various reasons in various

ways. See generally

Court Awarded Attorney

Fees,, Report

of

the

Third Circuit
Task Force,
108 F.R.D. 237. As stated above,
because the result in Stewart
created a common fund, the
attorneys in this matter mill receive their compensation
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from that fund. Stewart,
885 P.2d at 783. Courts award attorney
fees in common fund cases "to avoid the unjust enrichment of
those who benefit from the fund that is created . . . by the
litigation and who otherwise would bear none of the litigation
costs." Court Awarded Attorney
Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 250. In this
case, Barker and Flynn, at the request of a few ratepayers,
undertook enormous investments of time and money which, after
six years, accrued to the benefit of all U.S. West ratepayers
in Utah. Thus, the traditional common fund theory applies; the
ratepayer beneficiaries should not receive the benefit of the
attorneys' work without compensating them.
With this rationale in mind, we consider what constitutes
reasonable attorney fees. In Stewart,
we directed the
Commission to award fees in accordance with our decision in
Cabrera v. Cottrell,
694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985) .
Stewart,
885 P.2d at 783. Cabrera was a fee shifting case, where the
opposition, as opposed to the beneficiaries of the fund, paid
the attorney fees. In that case, we instructed trial judges
making attorney fee determinations to consult the Utah Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-106. [fn2] Cabrera,
694 P. 2d at
624. In deciding if a fee is generally reasonable, a court
should consider the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services;
(4) The amount involved and results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client
or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Stewart
is the first Utah case to permit attorney fees not
explicitly authorized by statute or contract. Stewart,
885 P.2d
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at 782. This case represents the first time we have supervised
an award under the common fund theory. See id. at 782-83.
Therefore, we must account for ways in which such awards might
require adjustments to the principles affecting ordinary
attorney fee cases.
As courts often do, we will use the lodestar method in
considering the attorney fees in this case. See Court
Awarded
Attorney
Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 242-43. An alternative approach the percentage of the fund method, described in id. at 255 —
is available, but we apply the lodestar method because the
Commission chose to use that method. The lodestar method
requires a determination of the hours reasonably expended on
the case as well as a reasonable hourly rate for the services.
Id. at 243. These two amounts are multiplied, and the total is
increased or decreased to account for the level of the risk
involved in the case and the quality of the work. Id.;
see
also

Lindy Bros.

Builders,

Inc.

v. American

Radiator

& Standard

Sanitary
Corp.,
540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (clarifying
lodestar method set forth in earlier opinion of same case,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973)). Courts often refer to this adjustment
of the basic hourly award as a "multiplier." Court
Awarded
Attorney
Fees, 108 F.R.D. at 243. We specifically addressed the
factors implicated by the use of a multiplier in Plumb v.
State,
809P.2d734, 740 n. 7 (Utah 1990). There, citing
Lindy,
we delineated five factors to consider explicitly in fixing a
multiplier: (1) the quality of work performed, (2) the
contingent nature of the case, [fn3] (3) the
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plaintiffs burden, (4) the risks assumed, and (5) the delay in
payment. Id.
The Commission agreed to compensate Flynn's time at $250 an
hour and Barker's at $175 an hour, and petitioners do not
object to these rates. They do, however, take issue with a
number of the Commission's other findings, which we address
below.

A.

Twenty-Five Percent
Reduction
of Hours Reported

The Commission reduced the number of hours spent by Barker
and Flynn on the Stewart case by twenty-five percent.
Petitioners argue that the reduction violated due process
principles because no one presented the Commission's reasons
for reduction at the hearing on fees, depriving petitioners of
an opportunity to respond. The Commission contends that it made
the twenty-five percent reduction because the attorneys' time
records lacked meaningful detail; Barker reconstructed his time
spent on the case; two attorneys spent time on the same task;
the records reflected inconsistencies in time billed for the
same task; and the time billed for certain tasks appeared
excessive on its face.
The Commission did not violate petitioners' due process
rights in making its findings. In Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743, we
held that a magistrate violated a class counsel's due process
rights by making an attorney fee determination without
counsel's having notice and by failing to hold a hearing on the

issue. Here, petitioners had adequate notice of the hearing and
presented testimony and evidence in support of their case.
Furthermore, the hearing transcript reflects the Commission's
concerns, for example, when one Commissioner remarked, "[T]he
Division and the Committee have attacked [Flynnfs hours] on
various grounds[,] one of which was they are not sufficiently
detailed." Therefore, petitioners had an opportunity at the
hearing to respond to the Commission's concerns, and the
Commission did not violate their right to due process.
Thus the Commission's twenty-five percent reduction
multiplier was not procedurally deficient. We examine the
evidence, however, to determine whether the reduction was
justified on substantial grounds. In petitioners' favor, Flynn
clarified at the hearing that the twenty-three hours recorded
as "reading" a brief included checking and reading cases,
statutes, and other materials as part of reviewing the 112-page
brief. Moreover, both petitioners made statements under oath
that they had understated their hours in the written
submissions by at least twenty-five percent. These statements
went uncontested. Furthermore, Dr. Mark Glick, a consultant on
law and economics issues, testified that petitioners expended
an unusually low number of hours for a case of this nature. An
affidavit by Patricia A. O'Rorke, who practices law in the
public utility area in Utah, testified that Flynn and Barker
worked the number of hours "reasonably required to achieve the
very substantial benefit conferred on the plaintiff class."
Nevertheless, one affidavit — by Gary A. Dodge, a partner
specializing in utility and regulatory matters at the law firm
of Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee — does state that the
reported hours seem "excessive" for the work performed, and the
descriptions of the work performed provide too little
information to decide otherwise. Yet, his testimony also
suggests that Flynn's expertise should have reduced the number
of hours needed, indicating that Flynn's hours were a bargain,
not just reasonable. The Commission also points to occasional
inconsistencies in the time records, with Barker at times
recording more hours than the other participants for the same
meetings.
Barker and Flynn initially accepted this case on a pro bono
basis. In February 1991, they realized they could not dispose
of the case as quickly as they had initially thought. At that
point, they asserted a request for attorney fees. They realized
that Utah had not previously allowed an award of attorney fees
without statutory or contractual authorization, but because the
question had never been directly addressed, they decided to
pursue it. Because of this history, Barker's failure to log his
time simultaneously and Flynn's general time-keeping methods
are understandable. The records available do provide a
sufficient basis for a determination of the hours they worked.
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Although we accord the Commission limited discretion in
determining the hours in this case, after reviewing the record
in light of the Cabrera factors, we award the full amount of
hours claimed by Flynn[fn3a] and all but 9.5 hours claimed

by Barker.[fn4] The evidence presented simply does not support
the Commission's arbitrary twenty-five percent reduction.
Considering, as required by Cabrera,
the novelty and
difficulty of the questions in Stewart,
petitioners' hours
are entirely reasonable. The Commission found that,the case was not
novel or difficult in view of one of Flynn's comments — that
the issues at the Commission level were clear-cut in his clients' favor.
Aside from the obvious observation that most advocates find the
law "clear" in their favor, the Commission's position also
ignores Flynn's testimony that a novel question of mootness
arose at the appellate level, requiring much work. In addition,
the attorney fees issue itself was clearly novel for Utah, as
discussed by the court in Stewart.
885 P.2d at 782. A reading
of Stewart
further indicates that many issues were at
least complex, if not novel. Moreover, as noted in Stewart,
the
complete lack of support from the Committee of Consumer
Services and the actions of the Division and the Commission
generally made this case very difficult. See generally
Id.
Furthermore, Flynn adequately explained why some of his
hours, which appeared excessive at first glance, actually
constituted reasonable work (such as the brief "reading"
example described earlier). With regard to experience, Flynn's
expertise in the areas of both state constitutional law and
utility law and Barker's knowledge of utility law convince us
that less knowledgeable attorneys performing the same work
would have taken much longer. Moreover, we do not believe that
anything in the financial arrangements between petitioners and
their clients caused petitioners to expend excessive hours on
the case. Flynn and Barker knew very well the possibility of
receiving no remuneration for their time and work. Such
knowledge would surely motivate efficiency rather than the
reverse.
The inconsistencies between times recorded in Barker's
records and those of Flynn and a paralegal are of some concern;
they may be attributable to the fact that Barker did not keep
contemporaneous records, as Flynn did. Thus, we reduce Barker's
hours to reflect the hours spent by other members of the
litigation team at the same meetings. [fn5] With this adjustment, we
can confidently conclude that Barker claimed a reasonable
number of hours.

B. Failure

to Use a

Multiplier

The Commission further argues that the number of hours times
the hourly rate of each attorney equals a reasonable attorney
fee and that it correctly refused to increase that amount by a
multiplier.
Petitioners argue that the Commission had to increase the
total fee by a multiplier to account for their risk of
nonpayment, the results they obtained, the complexity of the
case, the burdens undertaken, the efficiency of service, and
the delay in compensation. They argue that the Stewart
decision
established the law of the case, specifically finding that all
these factors were present and thus mandating the application
of a multiplier.

As stated above, we consider five factors in awarding a
multiplier: (1) the quality of work performed, (2) the
contingent nature of the case, (3) the plaintiffs burden, (4)
the risks assumed, and (5) delay in payment. The Commission
made no findings of fact on the quality of work performed, but
it did, by implication, account for the quality of petitioners1
work in large measure when it approved the hourly rates
petitioners requested. The record reflects that the rates
Barker and Flynn requested rank among the highest in Salt Lake
City. They can charge such amounts in part because of the
overall
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quality of their work as evidenced by their reputations. In
considering use of a multiplier, we do not intend to reward
them twice for the same quality. Instead, when considering
whether to award a multiplier for the quality of the work
performed, we must consider whether the quality of work in this
specific case exceeded the quality of work these attorneys
usually produce. Lindy,
the case originating the lodestar
method, suggests the following considerations in making this
determination:
1. The result obtained evaluated in terms of (a)
the potential money damages avaiilable to the class
member, i.e., a comparison of the extent of
possible recovery with the amount of actual verdict
or settlement; (b) the benefit — monetary or
nonmonetary — conferred on the class. . . .
2. An evaluation of the professional methods
utilized in processing the case, — rewarding the
use of efficient methods to expedite the case and
penalizing the use of methods the predominant
purpose of which was to delay or obstruct the
proceedings.
Lindy,
540 F.2d at 118. Although the second consideration has
no particular relevance to this case, the first provides useful
insight. Petitioners' advocacy resulted in a refund to
ratepayers of $4,630,164, including interest. Considering that
even when this court disposed of the Stewart case in 1994, we
still did not know whether the ratepayers would receive any
money, Stewart,
885 P.2d at 783, this result is quite
remarkable. In addition to monetary benefits, the ratepayers
received nonmonetary, permanent benefits in that USWC is
precluded from seeking excessive rates well into the future,
thus eliminating the need for further or continued litigation.
Given these extraordinary results, petitioners are entitled to
additional monetary recognition for the quality of their work.
The Commission failed to recognize these results. Therefore,
its decision not to award a multiplier should be disregarded.
To determine the contingent nature of the case,
Lindy suggests that we evaluate the last three factors: the
plaintiff's burden, the risks assumed, and the delay in
payment. Lindy,
540 F.2d at 117. At the outset, we note that
the Commission deemed the initial pro bono nature of
petitioners' relationship with their clients to militate
against the use of a multiplier, because petitioners did not

really expect to receive payment. Whether the attorneys
provided their services pro bono, at a discount, or at full
market rate does not effect a determination of reasonable
attorney fees. See Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886/ 895, 104
S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Ramos v. Lamm,
713 F.2d546, 551 (10th Cir. 1983). Although both these cases
concern a federal civil rights statute, the rationale that
justifies their findings is the same: The rule instructs courts
to consider the market rate for legal services, not to reduce
the rates for pro bono services or reduced costs. See
id.
Holding otherwise would only discourage lawyers from taking
such cases pro bono in the future. To the contrary, we wish to
encourage the kind of public service performed by Barker and
Flynn in taking this case despite the huge time commitment and
significant risk of nonpayment. The Commission misunderstood
the law on this point. Therefore, this aspect of its decision
merits no deference.
Looking next at the question of petitioners' burden, we
reiterate that the Stewart
case involved novel and difficult
questions. [fn6] It lasted six years, required a writ of review to
the state supreme court (which took two years to decide), and
included only the slightest possibility of payment. Petitioners
deserve the application of a multiplier to account for the
burdens this history reflects.
Moreover, in evaluating the risks assumed, the uncertainty of
payment in this case was very high; its availability was a
question of first impression. In addition, petitioners had
agreed to represent the rate-payers pro bono and thus could not
even rely on payment contingent upon their success in court.
Thus petitioners undertook significant financial risks.
Traditional contingency fee arrangements provide us with some
guidance in this case, in that the burdens and risks to counsel
in
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contingency cases are similar. Two of petitioners' affiants
contend, and respondents do not contradict, that contingency
fee cases in Utah requiring appeal usually set the fee at forty
percent of the recovery. By using a percentage, the contingency
fee arrangement accounts for results obtained and the amount
involved, as required by Cabrera,
in addition to the factors of
risk and delay in payment.
Finally, Flynn and Barker should receive some additional
amount to account for the lost use of the money they would have
received at the end of the case in normal contingency
circumstances. In an ordinary contingency case, the percentage
recovery is designed to account for the lost use of income
during the course of the case. Contingency contracts, however,
need not consider the extra time required in this case to
settle attorney fees, and some compensation is due petitioners
for the value of that loss.
To calculate what a contingency fee would have been in this
case, we take forty percent (the percentage generally charged
in contingency fee cases where there is an appeal) of the
$4,630,164 recovery generated by Barker and Flynn, which equals

$1,852,065.60. As stated above, Flynn worked 1607.25 hours at
$250 an hour, totaling $401,812.50. Barker worked 451 hours at
$175 an hour, totaling $78,925. Thus petitioners1 time alone is
worth $480,737.50. We award a multiplier to take into
consideration delay of payment, risk, quality of work,
contingency, and the plaintiffs burden. However, when the
common fund is quite high, as in this case, the percentage
recovery should be reduced. See Court Awarded Attorney
Fees,
108 F.R.D. at 256; see e.g., In re "Agent Orange"
Product
Liability
Litigation,
611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(awarding over $10,000,000 in attorney fees, less than six
percent of common fund). Therefore, although a multiplier of
four would more closely approximate the contingency
arrangement, a multiplier of 2.5, equaling $1,201,843.75, is
more appropriate given the size of the fund. In light of the
Cabrera factors, we hold that $1,201,843.75 represents a
reasonable attorney fee in this exceptional case.
C. Fifty Percent Reduction
of Paralegal Fees
This court has approved fee awards to paralegals, law clerks,
and legal assistants as a way of encouraging cost-effective
lawyering. Baldwin v. Burton,
850 P.2d 1188, 1200-01 (Utah
1993). A court must base attorney fee awards on the evidence
and support them by findings of fact. Cottonwood
Mall Co. v.
Sine,
830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992).
The Commission awarded paralegal fees at $25 an hour, stating
as justification that neither employee had paralegal training.
One "paralegal," Funk, is a consumer advocate in utility
matters. The other, McDermott, had finished his third year of
law school but had not taken the bar exam when he performed the
research in question. The affidavits submitted by both sides
support paralegal fees of at least $45 an hour. One affidavit
states that research assistants receive $60 an hour, while
another identifies $35 to $50 as the going rate. The $25 figure
comes from Funk's affidavit; he had done contract work for the
Commission at $25 an hour.
The record does not support the reduction in paralegal
compensation to $25. The $25 rate paid to Funk by the
Commission was for drafting legislation and the like, not for
paralegal work. The rule discussed above requiring payment of
the going rate for attorney fees applies with equal force to
paralegal fees. Public agencies often pay a reduced rate, but
the private rate sets the standard. Given the evidence in the
record, the paralegals should have been compensated at $45 an
hour at least.
However, because we have chosen to use the contingency fee to
approximate payment in this case, we do not award an additional
amount for paralegal fees and costs generally, because the
contingency fee scenario already encompasses these amounts.
D. Attorney Fee

Litigation

Petitioners request attorney fees for the litigation of the
attorney fee issue. In their favor, they cite Salmon,
where we
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stated, "[I]f a vindicated employee is required to
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expend attorney fees to recover the original fees to which he
was entitled, the cost of these subsequent fees must also be
reimbursed." Salmon, 916 P.2d at 896. Salmon, however, is a fee
shifting case. In this case, we awarded petitioners fees under
the common fund theory, to prevent the beneficiaries of their
efforts from receiving a benefit without having to pay for
their services. The common fund theory does not justify
awarding petitioners fees for litigating the amount of the fee
award. See Llndy,
540 F.2d at 111 ("There being no benefit to
the fund from services performed by [attorneys] in connection
with their fee application, there should be no attorneys1 fee
award from the fund for those services.").
The fees we award petitioners today compensate for the
benefits they achieved on behalf of the ratepayers. Their
litigation of the attorney fee issue benefits only themselves;
thus we conclude that they should bear the burden of that
expense. That they had to litigate the issue is not the "fault"
of the ratepayers, as it would be the fault of the opposing
party in a fee shifting case. In a common fund case, no one is
being "punished." Rather, all parties must simply bear their
own burden. Thus we hold that as a matter of law, petitioners
must pay their own costs for their litigation of the attorney
fee issue.
We award petitioners $1,201,843.75 less costs and fees of
$370,576.30 paid pursuant to the Commission order to compensate
for their costs and fees relating to the Stewart
case.
STEWART and RUSSON, JJ., concur in Justice DURHAM'S opinion.
[fnl] The order specifically states, "[I]f any party appealed
the Commission's Order on attorney fees . . ., U.S. West
Communications, Inc. . . . would not need to make the refund
or pay the attorney fees until the amount of attorney fees was
finally determined."
[fn2] Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) Code of Professional
Responsibility has since been designated Rules of Professional
Conduct, but rule has not changed.
[fn3] We are aware of the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of an
increase for contingency cases in fee shifting determinations.
See Burlington
v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567, 112 S.Ct, 2638,
2644, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992). We do not believe that the
Court's reasoning has equal force in common fund cases.
[fn3a] 1607.25 hours.
[fn4] 451 hours.
[fn5] Treating all discrepancies in favor of Flynn and the paralegal
who kept contemporaneous records, we reduce Barker's claim of
4 60.5 hours by 9.5 hours.
[fn6] See supra

section IV.A.

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting:
I dissent. I would affirm the award of attorney fees made by
the Commission.
Although the majority professes "our complete confidence in
the professionalism of the Commission," it then proceeds to
accord no confidence in its award of fees by reversing the
Commission on every determination of fact and law made by it.
The majority departs from our general rule of reviewing
awards of fees under an abuse of discretion standard and
instead imposes a heightened standard, not because of any bias
demonstrated by the Commission but because there is "a
potential for the appearance of bias."
The setting of fees here by the Commission is not different
from the everyday occurrence in the trial courts, where trial
judges who have been reversed on appeal are called upon to fix
a reasonable fee for the attorney who prosecuted the appeal and
was responsible for reversing the judge. Yet we have never
presumed that the judge could not be fair in such a situation
and imposed a heightened scrutiny in reviewing the judge's
award. We should not treat the Commission differently. The
members are entitled to our respect and confidence, and we
should not review their work with suspicion. So far as I know,
we have never reversed a judgment simply because "there is a
potential for the appearance of bias." We have always required
that bias be demonstrated. That has not been done here.
The award of fees made by the Commission is well supported by
the evidence, which has always been the standard by which we
have reviewed awards of fees. While the majority recites
evidence supporting the Commission's award, it gives no weight
to that evidence. Instead, the majority makes a de novo
determination of the factual issues which the Commission made
in setting a reasonable fee. For example, the Commission
reduced by twenty-five percent the number of hours for which
the attorneys should be compensated. This reduction was made
because the attorneys' time records lacked meaningful detail;
Barker reconstructed his time spent on the case; two attorneys
spent time on the same task; the records reflected
inconsistencies in time billed for the same task; and the time
billed for certain tasks appeared excessive on its face. In any
other case, this explanation would suffice, and we would not
hesitate to affirm the award made. But here, even though the
explanation is
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supported by the affidavit of Gary A. Dodge, a capable
practicing attorney, the majority rejects the Commission's
explanation because Barker and Flynn testified that they had
understated their hours by at least twenty-five percent and
observes that their testimony went uncontested. Of course it
went uncontested; it was subjective and incapable of being
challenged by anyone. But the Commission as the fact finder was
not required to believe their testimony. Nevertheless, the
majority reverses the Commission on disputed facts and
substitutes themselves as the fact finders.

In a similar manner, the majority reverses the Commission's
determination that $25 per hour was a reasonable rate for Funk
and McDermott, who were not paralegals. Indeed, Funk had done
work for the Commission at $25 per hour, and McDermott was a
law student. Yet the majority rejects this reasoning of the
Commission and awards them "$45 an hour at least," the rate for
paralegals, which they admittedly were not. Again, the majority
rolls over the Commission's factual determination.
The majority recognizes that "the rates Barker and Flynn
requested rank among the highest in Salt Lake City." Barker
will receive $175 for every hour requested except for the
9.5-hour token reduction made by the majority. Flynn will
receive $250 per hour for every hour he requested. But it seems
that is not enough. The majority then proceeds to apply a
multiplier of 2.5.
I do not discount the value of the service provided by the
attorneys. They deserve to be fairly compensated. But when they
are awarded compensation for almost every hour they requested,
even though their time records were subject to question and
they are paid at the highest rates known in this community, I
fail to see the necessity of or fairness in applying a
multiplier. The attorneys took the case on a pro bono basis and
had no agreement with anyone for a fee. They are to be
commended for their public spirit and hard work. I would leave
them with their handsome fee determined without a multiplier
and would not shower them with a windfall.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., concurs in Associate Chief Justice HOWE's
dissenting opinion.
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